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by jpeloquin
1835 days ago
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Skimming the "Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence" grant [0] cited in the posted article suggests a potentially useful role for gain of function research, although I'm not sure if that method was actually used. The intended work was to (1) look for unknown viruses in bats and sequence the virus' genomes, (2) screen people who live and work nearby to see which viruses cross over to people, and (3) test the infectiousness of these viruses in cell culture and animal studies in a laboratory setting. The point of #3 would be to systematically compare the properties of viral strains with slight genetic variation to reveal which parts of the genome are responsible for which outcomes (symptoms, which species can be infected, etc.). Information from the lab comparisons would be used to help interpret which naturally occurring viruses observed in the screening work are potentially dangerous. Work like this _could_ help prevent a pandemic. (It would be bitterly ironic if it instead caused a pandemic.) Synthetic variation of the viral genome ("gain of function", but also loss of function) allows direct experimentation to be done in the lab (#3). Direct experimentation is very useful because it allows systematic comparison to establish cause & effect; which genes do what, and how they interact. If a large supply of naturally occurring variants are already available though this can also be achieved, with less certainty, by correlation. But if humanity is going to be proactive about studying viruses, I don't see much reason to avoid gain of function research. Collecting and studying wild viruses means that dangerous new strains will be present in labs regardless, so either way stringent safety controls, monitoring, and containment plans are absolutely necessary. [0] https://reporter.nih.gov/search/q4dXFDKEsU-IkTAYgowOKw/proje... |
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Only if "experimentation" includes "infecting humans with various strains and seeing what happens". Is that what you're advocating?
> Collecting and studying wild viruses means that dangerous new strains will be present in labs regardless
Dangerous new strains that happened to evolve naturally is one thing.
Dangerous new strains that are purposely being created by experimenters for the express purpose of finding ones that are more infective is another.
> so either way stringent safety controls, monitoring, and containment plans are absolutely necessary.
This would appear to be an argument for not doing this type of research in the Wuhan lab, which evidently did not have sufficient controls in place. Moreover, I see no indication that any assessment of such controls at the lab, and confirmation that they were sufficient, was a prerequisite for funding this research. That seems insane.