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by cdsmith
1846 days ago
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Author here. No, it doesn't mean that. If the election is held to determine who wins, then the outcome is who wins, and everyone has opinions about that same outcome. Contrast this to the matching problem, where the outcome is where ALL the candidates are assigned. You're allowed to have an opinion about where you are assigned. I'm allowed to have an opinion about where I am assigned. These opinions might conflict indirectly because of limited spots, but they don't conflict directly. This is very different from the election case, where if you and I have different opinions about who we want to win, those opinions are always contradictory. |
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Obviously once there are two candidates remaining, Gibbard's Theorem doesn't apply, so I'm guessing that any procedure which reduces the set to two outcomes must itself be subject to strategy, but it would be interesting if allowing people to cast a separate vote in a run-off election was enough to make the first round no longer require strategy.