[dragonwriter]

> I would suggest that this probably isn't the case.

It is; both the theoretical and empirical support for this being the effect of FPTP is overwhelming.

> They can be acheived by splitting other parties, but while Party A can choose to form a superparty eith Party B, it can’t choose to durably split Party C instead. Parties in FPTP will, to the extent that they can get away with it, funnel support to minor party candidates that will split the vote of their major opponent, but that’s a short-term tactical rather than long-term strategic maneuver.

> The parties have more targeted appeal, just enough to squeak past the other parties. This is the case in India, for example.

It’s really not, though India is complicated by being a federal system (which means a bunch of different electoral area with different and interacting party systems) and being in the middle of a long realignment from, at the national level, a dominant-party system under Congress (and looks a lot like at least temporarily to a dominant party system under BJP, again at the national level.)