[vvillena]

In a PoW chain, Vitalik Buterin can talk, propose, and make patches to an Etherum client, but it means nothing unless miners approve the changes by running the updated client. He is the most important voice in that coin's ecosystem, but miners are the ones who decided to approve the fork.

Switching consensus to a different set of rules is entirely within the scope of a PoW system, and it's based on the same mechanism that gives legitimacy to the rest of the blockchain. The original Bitcoin paper explains this perfectly, so I won't replicate it here.

[rcxdude]

> In a PoW chain, Vitalik Buterin can talk, propose, and make patches to an Etherum client, but it means nothing unless miners approve the changes by running the updated client. He is the most important voice in that coin's ecosystem, but miners are the ones who decided to approve the fork.

No, it means nothing unless users use, buy, and sell the coin. The miners' are subservient to them, assuming the miners are trying to make money. Miners do not decide or approve which set of consensus rules people decide to use, though they can, at a potentially quite significant loss, disrupt the functioning of the network somewhat.

[incrudible]

> Miners do not decide or approve which set of consensus rules people decide to use, though they can, at a potentially quite significant loss, disrupt the functioning of the network somewhat.

Miners are users. If they don't mine the blocks, the system literally doesn't work. Suppose that a large majority of miners refuses to upgrade for some reason. One part of the users can upgrade and wait for new blocks for a long time, while the users that don't upgrade can actually use the system as if nothing happened. Who is going to throw in the towel first? Maybe it's the miners, maybe it's the ETH holders, you can't know.

[CryptoPunk]

No, other users can easily institute a new lower difficulty in the upgrade to counteract the drop in POW from the defection of miners.

The subservience of miners to users at large in the determination of the market leading fork is best exemplified in the scenario of users switching to a PoS chain. In this case the miners have no power to sabotage the upgraded chain.

[incrudible]

> No, other users can easily institute a new lower difficulty in the upgrade to counteract the drop in POW from the defection of miners.

Sure, you can alternatively anticipate that your fork will not get miner support and give it low difficulty, leaving it vulnerable to spam instead.

It doesn't change the fact that this fork now only has a tiny share of the hashrate, no better than some random altcoin. Why should it be considered the "real" chain? Because it has Vitalik Buterin's face on it? Maybe that works for Ethereum, but it wouldn't work for Bitcoin.

> The subservience of miners to users at large in the determination of the market leading fork is best exemplified in the scenario of users switching to a PoS chain.

...which hasn't happened yet. Of course, if your users don't care about hashrate or PoW, you can transition the software to anything. Maybe that's true for Ethereum. That doesn't make miners subservient. Either they're highly influential (PoW) or they're not part of the picture at all (PoS). There's no scenario in which you can force miners to adopt some change.

[CryptoPunk]

>>There's no scenario in which you can force miners to adopt some change.

Your point was that miners' cooperation is required to successfully upgrade:

>>One part of the users can upgrade and wait for new blocks for a long time, while the users that don't upgrade can actually use the system as if nothing happened

My point is that an upgrade can be implemented without any cooperation from miners. A change to PoS would be the exemplar of that.

[incrudible]

> Your point was that miners' cooperation is required to successfully upgrade

I didn't say that. My point is that miners will decide which chain gets the bigger hashrate and that chain is likely to be adopted as the "real" chain by users, if it's the vast majority of the miners. Furthermore, the prospect that there is no miner support would make users reluctant to upgrade in the first place.

> My point is that an upgrade can be implemented without any cooperation from miners. A change to PoS would be the exemplar of that.

What do you mean by "upgrade" then? Bitcoin was "upgraded" to Bitcoin Cash, an arguably better blockchain. Some people even consider it the "real" Bitcoin, but that's a minority opinion.

> A change to PoS would be the exemplar of that.

You can't use an event that hasn't happened yet as evidence to support your argument. Maybe there will be a flawless transition to PoS in Ethereum, due to influence of developers and the prospect of lower transaction fees. Maybe there will be ETH2 and ETH at the end, traded as distinct assets.

[didericis]

I don't see how switching consensus from a proof of work system to proof of stake system "is entirely within the scope of a PoW system". If the majority of the network decides to do that, I understand why that makes it valid, and this is intentionally hyperbolic/don't think proof of stake is properly viewed like this, but to me that reads like "voting in a dictatorship is entirely within the scope of a democratic system". Technically it might be true, but the moment you make that valid democratic decision a decision like that can't happen the same way again.