[vbsteven]

Not necessarily. If you have multiple keys active in local your SSH Agent, then connect to a malicious host with Agent Forwarding enabled, the malicious host could try to connect to to a third host and I believe it will try to use all active keys from the local agent.

[CuriousCosmic]

Personally my approach is to use a unique GPG Authentication key per machine with gpg-agent. They can't log back into the current machine and unless it's a targetted attack they shouldn't have any knowledge of my other machines.

Of course there's a list of common services that you could probably try and they could gain access there like say push/pull on github/gitlab however as long as those common services have another layer of protection (i.e. mandatory commit signing) it should limit the effective attack area pretty effectively.

I also generally find that ssh connections will be one way (i.e. you typically only set up SSH authentication to flow in a specific direction). As long as your SSH authentication graph is directed and acyclic (i.e. no loops and connections only go in one direction), there is little ability for a malicious server to access other nodes in the SSH auth graph provided you connect from a leaf or near leaf node.

I don't use agent forwarding because of the issues with it but there are definitely ways to reduce the attack area that it provides.