| > Noticing malware after it's installed based on a hash isn't any better than eg windows defender. The App Store doesn't help with that at all. False. Once a scam has been detected, the developer account can be disabled, which adds cost to new attempts, unlike windows defender. > Nope, lots of people knew it was happening for years before Apple actually stopped it and it happens with other libraries still. That doesn’t change anything. >No, because that would enable social engineering attacks once again. > People still get tricked into installing CA certs which is just as effective since everything has to be done in a browser due to the App Store restrictions. > So no this hasn't prevented social engineering attacks, A false statement. Many kinds of social engineering attacks have definitely been prevented. > it's only changed them Here you admit that significant classes of attack have been prevented. Your argument is that because not all attacks have been prevented, there is no value in preventing attacks. This is an obvious fallacy. |
>Here you admit that significant classes of attack have been prevented.
I don't think people care whether they lost things on their phone because of malware or because of a fake CA cert, the attack works pretty much the same way and has the same result.
>False. Once a scam has been detected, the developer account can be disabled, which adds cost to new attempts, unlike windows defender.
You don't need a dev account to distribute malware in dylibs.
>> Nope, lots of people knew it was happening for years before Apple actually stopped it and it happens with other libraries still.
>That doesn’t change anything.
It means the App Store doesn't stop malware before it's able to exfiltrate data from large numbers of users for long periods of time. That's the justification for it.