[tfp137]

The "other side of the world" wars are mostly fought by the young, because they haven't developed enough skepticism to ask whether what they're being asked to do benefits the country as a whole, or only certain actors and industries. The old and rich start wars, the young and poor fight them.

[pasabagi]

The old, rich, and stupid. One of the things that has been blowing my mind recently is the awareness of how many wars happen as a result of accident, miscommunication, and institutional inertia. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour started off as a hypothetical 'how could we win a potential war with the US', then over time, gained so much momentum that even though its principal architect thought it was a very bad idea, and although it was obviously not in Japan's national interest, it ended up going ahead.

[kebman]

Wasn't there a whole ordeal with competing entities, even within national organizations and army branches, who were all zealously entrenched in their own little jurisdictions?

[pasabagi]

That too - but that's present in any state. Japan just had the weirdest combination of resting all authority in the emperor, while having a strong tradition of the emperor never exercising any practical authority. So you get stuff like the creation of a puppet state in Manchuria essentially against the will of the Japanese prime minister.

I think the basic structure of a leader that theoretically has absolute power, but practically speaking is a kind of empty suit, is actually pretty generalizable and common. Japan is an extreme example, but I wouldn't be surprised if the Iraq war was the result of a similar combination of institutional momentum and leadership vacuum[0].