[altfredd]

This isn't about Google's control over OS. Of course, Google fully controls Android it, so they can compromise it anytime. But if such compromise gets detected, Google will lose trust.

The move away from developer signing towards Google's signing will makes it harder to detect such event.

[iudqnolq]

My argument is that a hypothetical compromise of an app never gives google more power than they could hypothetically have now. I also don't see why it would be harder to detect. Why do you think that's the case?

[altfredd]

This is a slippery slope fallacy. Your government has enough power to detain and execute you. Does that mean, that you should give them even more power?

Even if one OS component (Google Services) is centrally controlled and can be used to attack you, this does not mean, that you should make other parts less secure. Real-world attacks are complex and backdoors are fragile and prone to being detected. Embedding a backdoor in proprietary code of Google Services is easier than embedding it into AOSP. Hijacking a specific application is easier yet.