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by ovi256
1898 days ago
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The fraudsters setup premium numbers with some other telephony provider, possibly in another country. Then they use those numbers to receive 2FA (two factor auth) passwords (either SMS or read aloud in calls). Because the defrauded party's servers called those premium numbers through Twilio, the defrauded party has to pay Twilio. AFAIK there's no easy way to always, securely detect premium numbers. The fraudster can setup a forward from a normal number to a premium one anyway. So checking number prefix is useless. One could listen for the "After the beep, this call will be billed at X c/min" recording that premium numbers in honest countries have. The fraudsters manage to find less honest premium number providers that skip these. This is a well enough known issue that Twilio has a page about it: https://www.twilio.com/learn/voice-and-video/toll-fraud |
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