[qchris]

Thanks for the info, I hadn't heard about the USB isolation architecture issue.

I'm not sure about the status of LUKS on PureOS, but I know that Mobian supports it and there is a supported build of Mobian for the Librem 5. First-hand, I've encrypted my Pinephone image, but don't have a Librem 5 so can't independently confirm that it actually includes that during the eMMC flashing process, although I don't have a reason to believe elsewise.

Not sure if it's bad practice to share, but then what options do you use? If Debian's security model isn't enough, do you roll your own Linux base from something else instead? What kind of hardware is there as an alternative?

[kop316]

Considering most of his other post is factually incorrect and/or out of date, I am skeptical of the claim to be frank.

[fsflover]

Are you skeptical about bad security of USB? Here you go: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/device-handling-security/#usb-s....

[kop316]

I'm skeptical of that person's claims, primarily because the document the individual sourced as "fact" was riddled with factual errors. I don't know enough about USB security to make a judgement one way or another.

Thank you for this source, I'll check it out!

[kop316]

So in reading that overview, the same attacks that would apply to USB apply PCIe:

> The connection of an untrusted USB device to dom0 is a security risk since the device can attack an arbitrary USB driver (which are included in the linux kernel), exploit bugs during partition-table-parsing or simply pretend to be a keyboard.

This would be the same for any PCIe device. PCIe does not have any cryptographic authentication scheme that I am aware of, and PCIe device drivers are likewise in the linux kernel.

> The whole USB stack is put to work to parse the data presented by the USB device in order to determine if it is a USB mass storage device, to read its configuration, etc. This happens even if the drive is then assigned and mounted in another qube.

I don't see how this would be different versus a PCIe device?

> If you connect USB input devices (keyboard and mouse) to a VM, that VM will effectively have control over your system.

USB controllers use PCIe in order to function.

It seems the primary difference between the two are which set of tools you go after to attck the system. The primary difference is that PCIe device attacks are less so in the wild (I do not know of a PCIe rubber ducky, but there is nothing stopping anyone from making it), and (depending on your system) involve more invasive physical access (USB is a physical port, but then again, Thunderport is effevtiely PCIe in a port: https://tidbits.com/2015/01/09/thunderstrike-proof-of-concep... . There is an example attack against PCIe).

As far an an IOMMU goes, that exists because PCIe uses DMA, so am IOMMU enforces boundaries so that a rogue PCIe device cannot do a DMA attack (here is one such exmaple: https://papers.put.as/papers/macosx/2006/ab_firewire_rux2k6-... . I skimmed through it so I am not sure if it is entrely correct, but the theme of the attack applies). But an IOMMU is typically software based too, so one can attack that and the DMA controller. USB does not use DMA.

[atat7024]

> because the document the individual sourced as "fact" was riddled with factual errors.

Some of that outdated post's problems could be rectified. Some (important!) ones cannot.

As stated elsewhere: wake me up when you have an IOMMU.

[atat7024]

"You're wrong!"

I can play that game, too!

[kop316]

Skeptical != wrong

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/skepticism

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/wrong

If there are factual in accuracies with my claims, I am happy to be proven wrong. That's how I learn!

I just need proper citations.