| I can understand your perspective, but that's only held up if one subscribes to the (erroneous and misunderstood/misused version of) Karl Popper's Paradox of Tolerance: > A tolerant society should be tolerant by default,
> With one exception: it should not tolerate intolerance itself. First, at face value, consider two individuals engaging about one's identity preference: Alice wants to be referred to by a non-binary pronoun. Bob doesn't wish to comply. The direct harm to Alice is a feeling of rejection and othering by another individual. What is the equivalent justice to restore this perceived harm? To my mind, it would be a likewise rejection of self by an individual, preferably by Alice. However, it may sometimes result in Alice publicly posting about it or telling their friends about it and a deluge of hate is poured on Bob for his actions. This "punishment" cannot reasonably be perceived as just because the reaction is outsized. Now, consider a similar scenario in which Bob does not know Alice, and he expresses publicly that he does not wish to recognize alternative pronouns. The effect may be that Alice, et al perceive offense and are hurt by this broad statement. But Bob did not assert this on Alice specifically, nor anyone. It was an expression of preference (or a rejection thereof). Still, a mob of offended parties (and their allies) may engage in large scale, directed defamatory remarks. Given Bob's broad and general statement, is that reaction just or unjust? In order to perceive it as balanced, one would have to subscribe to the Paradox of Tolerance: that tolerance of intolerance is intolerant. However, the applicability of this philosophy implies that an expression of a desire not to recognize alternative pronouns is not just a personal expression, but a directive to others. I'll leave it up to the reader to consider both sides of that application, but let's presume that an expression is, in fact, a directive to others that they, too, should reject alternative pronouns. Now Bob's statement can be perceived to affect individuals of whom he's never met, thus suggesting harm to a number of people. Is a mass response of directed verbal harm a just reaction to his expression? If one believes that implicit harm could be found, then a response of direct harm by many people would be just. But the Paradox of Tolerance doesn't, actually, support this perspective. (Even though it's often cited.) For harm to be justly foisted on an individual who simply has or expresses intolerant views, those views must be actively harmful. As Karl Popper wrote: > I do not imply, for instance, that we should always suppress the utterance of intolerant philosophies; as long as we can counter them by rational argument and keep them in check by public opinion, suppression would certainly be unwise. To "keep them in check by public opinion" does not mean—in our context—through force, as he explicitly addresses "suppression [read: force] would certainly be unwise." So the thought remains: what is a just response to a broadcast of preference contrary to another's preference? My thought would be: a likewise broadcast of preference in favor of alternative pronouns. Note that this does not explicitly target Bob, as he did not explicitly target an individual. So when the parent expresses the "extreme" view of "insanity", they are likely following the outsized, intentional acts of violence/vengeance against people who did not, in fact, directly harm the group engaging in this retaliatory act. For one to justify the force of many against the implicit harm enacted by an individual, one has to stretch the bounds of justice to allow realized damage in response to their perceived harm. Thus, parent's perception that those on the side of the pronoun discussion are "extreme" and "insane" is—taking their words intent and not literally—quite reasonable. For that not to be reasonable, one must find it reasonable, instead, to engage in outsized, real, harmful actions in response to an expressed opinion. If one believes it to be unreasonable to seek to damage the career—and by extension, life—of someone who prefers to be identified as "they/them" for exercising that preference, then one must also find it to be unreasonable to enact such harm to someone who chooses to exercise their preference of not referring to others as such. If one perceives that one such reaction can be characterized as "extreme", then it is reasonable to perceive the inverse behavior to be characterized as "extreme". And if one chooses to reject the balance of this logical equivalence, then one is behaving illogically. And if one justifies the use of this extreme response illogically, then it would be reasonable to characterize this behavior as "extreme" and "insanity", colloquially speaking. I welcome reasoned responses. |