That's a specialized version of the question, is it really evil to kill evil people? But it's also a bit off-topic; the more important one is, are only evil people getting killed by drone strikes executed by people who (claim to) try to kill only evil people? The answer to that is a resounding no. We can debate the specifics of this, but it wasn't my point.
My point was, the concept of layers of indirection making perpetrating evil/immoral acts easier is a well-recognized one[0], and drone strikes are the usual example - the killer has no personal risk, and the act itself involves operating video game controllers while watching a low-resolution image of distant events. And, for many practical reasons, this has been embraced by the military. Cheaper, less trauma for soldiers, less bad press, less likely the soldier will hesitate or spare the lives of their targets.
And thus I'm asking: if that works so well for killing, and there isn't a big pushback against this[1], then why criticize the case where the similar levels of detachment are making people more likely to do good deeds? If people are more likely to donate to good causes further away than they are to those close to them, then why not be just happy that more people are donating to good causes?
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[0] - It most likely has a formal name in psychology, but I'm not aware of it.
[1] - There is some pushback, but I don't see it rising to the level actually influencing any decision-making in the US.
Am I missing some context here? This keyphrase gives me some articles about how UNICEF is helping mitigate the problem of arsenic in drinking water in Bangladesh. This is good, right? Or are they, or other charitable initiatives, somehow responsible for causing it in the first place?
>are they, or other charitable initiatives, somehow responsible for causing it in the first place
That is how the story goes. Millions of wells were dug via aid that turned out to be contaminated with arsenic then ingested by tens of millions of people. Many of whom suffered over the years thinking they were "cursed".
I don't know how culpable the aid organizations really were, but even if it's just one of those "truthy" things that isn't quite true, it represents what can happen when people are detached from consequences of trying to do good very vividly.
>My point was, the concept of layers of indirection making perpetrating evil/immoral acts easier is a well-recognized one
It seems that you are again assuming that drone strikes are evil immoral acts.
Most people view civilian casualties in war as a trolley car problem, (e.g. a necessary evil in an overall moral action)
I don't really care what most people think. If I chose my beliefs based solely on what most people thought, I would be guilty of committing the bandwagon fallacy. So don't hide behind "most people". What do you think about this issue?
My own personal view is this: The Geneva convention forbids the killing and torture of non-combatants. The Geneva convention exists for a reason: without it, war would be more brutal and kill many more innocent people. Sure, it's easier to destroy the enemy if you don't worry too much about civilian casualties. But if both sides reason that way, the advantage to each cancels out, and the net outcome is just more civilian deaths.
It's cheap to say "oh it's a trolley problem" when we're talking about killing some innocent people thousands of miles away in order to take out an enemy general. Imagine if the civilians killed by each drone strike were all Americans. Want to kill that enemy commander? It'll cost you 5 American lives. Same logic from a trolley problem standpoint, but I expect you'd get some very different results on your poll.
I think that the killing of civilians is undesirable, but clearly moral under the right conditions. The proposition is not weather one should "worry too much about civilian casualties" but if they are morally justifiable at all.
Do you really hold that that it isn't acceptable to kill 1 non-combatant to save a greater number of non-combatants at a future date?
You can change the conditions or description, but it is still a trolly problem.
Imagine the "default" track splitting into a hundred million tracks, which all cross and merge into and separate from each other. It's such a maze that nobody can really tell what path the trolley will take once it enters a particular track. There's a couple thousand people in blue shirts tied down to a single-digit number of those tracks. A hundred-million-way split is essentially a bump in the main track, which means the trolley will randomly pick one of the hundred million of directions.
The service track (which splits off the main track before the hundred-million split) has a couple redshirts tied to it, plus 50 yellow-shirts per each redshirt. If you flip the switch, the trolley is sure to travel down the service track.
Additionally, the rules of iterating the problem are: if you don't flip a switch, there's a small chance the game ends. If you do flip a switch, the game will always continue, and there's a small chance that next round, more blueshirts will be tied to some of the hundred million tracks, and a small chance that the trolley will go down the main track regardless of your choice.
What do you choose? The US government answer is essentially to jam the switch in the "to service track position", because "fuck it, we don't care about non-blue shirts, and besides, the trolley company pays us to make sure the trolleys keep going".
Overall, I think I agree with your analogy, which illustrates the complexity of the problem.
If I follow, you are claiming that:
1. Lives saved by military intervention are unpredictable
2. The people killed by military intervention are categorically different than those saved
3. The number of lives saved changes over time.
4. Military intervention on average kills more than it saves (Today)
5. There are ulterior motives at play
OF these, I think 1-3 are pretty agreeable, 4 is unknown, and 5 is true, but generally overstated.
>What do you choose?
Given the enormous complexity of the problem, I would hire an organization of professionals to make lever choices, and support the scrutiny of this organization by competent 3rd parties.
I would be highly skeptical of anyone who claims that it is "evil" to ever pull the lever.
The real challenges are twofold:
First is the asymmetrical information between the professional lever pullers and the 3rd party critics. 3rd party critics have no visibility to the tracks and the lever pullers dont tell them if the blue shirts are one or a hundred track slips away from the trolly.
Second, The lever pullers are hired by the blueshirts, and individual blueshirts have radically different views on how many red/yellow shirt lives are worth one blueshirt life.
Also, it is a created trolley car problem not the trolley car problem. And creating such a situation instead of coming across it is definitely morally evil.
How is it a new trolly problem?
Technology may have changed, but I don't see how that changes the morality.
If it is moral to minimize the deaths by pulling a lever, shouldn't it also be moral to invent the lever?
Someone can certainly argue that drone strikes are not always an effective way to save lives, but if they are, I don't see an argument that makes them evil.
Yes, because these are extrajudicial killings with high death tolls and serious injuries for bystanders.
Suppose China, Russia, or the EU would conduct drone strikes on US soil but only target evil people such as Donald Rumsfeld, who is known to have ordered torture and initiated a war under false pretense. However, many bystanders including women and children would be killed as well. Would you be against it?
For every person that is labelled "evil" by the US, I'm sure there are thousands who would consider them "good". I would hazard to guess that there are more people who considered Osa Bin Laden "good" than consider you "good" and could make a case that you are "evil". Does that means that they have a right to kill you? Or does the US government only get the right to designate people Good or Evil?
I'm not personally against usage of drones in some totally general way, but we should keep in mind why the Bush to Obama shift was made. Aside from the technology simply maturing and growing more viable, we went away from having teams of special operators apprehend terrorism suspects in surgical snatch and grab operations and toward just murdering them with drones for two basic reasons.
One, surgical snatch and grab operations sometimes result in high profile failures where US operators are themselves captured or die in the process, which becomes a huge local media sensation. Two, when you arrest people, you run into the issue of what to do with them. Hence, all of the continuing problems with Guantanamo. Do you give them rights? Transfer them to regular prisons? Release them? Hold an actual trial at some point? We still haven't figured it out, and the easiest answer is just stop arresting people and kill them instead.
I leave it to you to decide which of the two options is more ethical, but the reasons we did it have nothing to do with ethics. And drones are inherently less precise and also kill whoever happens to be nearby a lot more often than Seal Team Six.
When another country or organization turns their drones on us because of our antiquated human rights ideas, inability to form consensus, and extreme ideologies - from their perspective - opinions will get much clearer.
Best way to stop the drone wars at this point are for us to stop now.
My point was, the concept of layers of indirection making perpetrating evil/immoral acts easier is a well-recognized one[0], and drone strikes are the usual example - the killer has no personal risk, and the act itself involves operating video game controllers while watching a low-resolution image of distant events. And, for many practical reasons, this has been embraced by the military. Cheaper, less trauma for soldiers, less bad press, less likely the soldier will hesitate or spare the lives of their targets.
And thus I'm asking: if that works so well for killing, and there isn't a big pushback against this[1], then why criticize the case where the similar levels of detachment are making people more likely to do good deeds? If people are more likely to donate to good causes further away than they are to those close to them, then why not be just happy that more people are donating to good causes?
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[0] - It most likely has a formal name in psychology, but I'm not aware of it.
[1] - There is some pushback, but I don't see it rising to the level actually influencing any decision-making in the US.