[epivosism]

The actual Feynman personal take on risk & his investigation:

https://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v2appf.htm

Short and readable.

  It appears that there are enormous differences of opinion as to the probability of a failure with loss of vehicle and of human life. The estimates range from roughly 1 in 100 to 1 in 100,000. The higher figures come from the working engineers, and the very low figures from management. What are the causes and consequences of this lack of agreement? Since 1 part in 100,000 would imply that one could put a Shuttle up each day for 300 years expecting to lose only one, we could properly ask "What is the cause of management's fantastic faith in the machinery?"

...

  For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled.

[bellyfullofbac]

The Rogers comission was also just going to bury the problem and almost absolve NASA of guilt, Feynman fought to get his appendix in the report, and he also later said that he was being gently lead to discover the O-rings issue during his investigations.

[dmos62]

Feynman had a way with words. I might look him up for some light reading.

[tyleo]

I highly recommend doing so. I had a great time with his book, “Surely You’re Joking, Mr. Feynman”

[maxwelldone]

I enjoyed reading that. Feynman doesn't sugar coat things. I also recommend "what do you care what other people think" book. The second half covers Challenger investigation wich is quite amusing to read.