[lambda2001]

I would disagree on this point. I work in aerospace with a a lot of smart folks. Boeing's 737 issues are a product of many years of poor management choices, but I don't think represent the talent of the industry as a whole.

[wwww4alll]

737 Max is just the poster child for issues in aerospace. There are many other examples, F35, 787, F22, are just recent examples.

The flow of smart folks in the pipeline are dwindling. You may be working with smart folks, but how many are going to retire in few years? Who are going to replace them? Does the current education system produce the number and quality of candidates needed?

[tehjoker]

Project failures cannot be simply attributed to a workforce problem without a detailed analysis especially when the top example is a widely reported management failure.

[wwww4alll]

It’s an industry failure, society failure, not just a single project failure.

This country can not build a new reliable airplane, like it did decades ago.

It’s failed project after project. Ask yourself why this is the case? What has changed in this country? What has changed in the industry. What has changed in society?

It’s not just aircraft. Where are US high speed rail systems, that other countries built 30, 40 years ago?

Where are modern infrastructure?

Who works in water treatment plants, providing clean drinking water for millions of people? What happens when all these guys retire in few years?

Tik Tok is all fun and games, and no one wants to do the hard messy work of treating water for consumption.

[tehjoker]

My working hypothesis is that the business class and politicians are looting the country until the empire crumbles.

[rtkwe]

The F35 seems like a project management issue more than engineering. No one stopped the scope from creeping out of control as new tech and capabilities were added.

[dragonwriter]

> No one stopped the scope from creeping out of control as new tech and capabilities were added.

The problem with F-35 wasn't scope creep, it was the initial premise which operated under a mistaken belief that getting a single “do everything” airframe to maximize commonality would drive down unit cost, rather than driving it up through the conflicting needs of distinct missions.