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by henns
1941 days ago
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Thanks for pointing out that I was off in my original estimate (a hasty web search showed the wrong cryptocurrency; almost nobody mines bitcoin on CPUs anymore :). From what I can see, a more realistic estimate for a single core on a desktop is in the 2^26 range. Keep in mind that the PBKDF2 defender is single-threaded by design, whereas the attacker is not. This still represents ~a half million x advantage for the attacker/$2k they spend. For $1m, they can guess passwords ~200 million times faster than you. If we assume memory is the limiting factor for argon2, then even if a specialized attacker can use it at scale for 1/20th the cost, a 20x advantage is much better for the defender than a 500,000x advantage. |
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