[esotericn]

In the general case I don't think that majority miner attacks can be defended against without changing the hash algorithm.

Specific cases like "empty blocks" could be addressed via a hard fork.

But there's nothing stopping miners from faking transactions in blocks, sending amounts to themselves, filling the block with OP_RETURNs, or just doing the minimum possible to get around your "fix".

PoW absolutely relies on >50% of miners being honest, always has done.

[AffableSpatula]

The purpose of this project is to challenge people to be specific about the details of that hard fork. Currently there are no theoretical proposals, or concrete BIPs to address.

[safog]

Can't you do worse things if you have >50% hash power? It seems like DoS is pretty mild all things considered.

[esotericn]

It depends how rationally the market responds, I guess.

A reorg attack and a DoS are equivalent in my mind - anyone who's capable of pulling off a lengthy DoS is also capable of performing a reorg attack, whether they actually do or not is kind of irrelevant.

[AffableSpatula]

there is a type of reorg attack I proposed that's now been dubbed a "purge attack", that has the effect of destabalising the network by creating a window for all affected users to double spend their previously "finalised" transactions: https://medium.com/deribitofficial/destabilizing-bitcoin-con...