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I still don't see how any government granting committee can outperform hundreds of private venture funds competing for exposure to new opportunities. Even if you have a government dept. of 10x geniuses, they don't scale to compete with a healthy investment community. As described, the risks I see are that, it has the incentives for a patronage slush fund, there will be selection bias to hedge political risk around people applying, and it will just become another grant vehicle for academics in the publish-or-perish regime, and instead of "making something people want," in the venture model, it means, "find things nobody else understands well enough to care about." To people outside of it, it will look a lot like corruption. |
Government can invest in projects which have different types of return: projects which are only beneficial or more beneficial if given away for free, projects which will take a lot longer than a decade to come to fruition, projects which are important to government social objectives but just not big enough commercial markets to be interesting to VC and projects which the government will be the only customer for so might as well cut the VC middleman out. Even on a purely financial return basis, the VC captures only captures the part of the return the portfolio company can charge for: the government collects the tax receipts from everyone who benefits in the sector including competitors who copy, and doles out resources to the entire supply chain and consumers too/
Sure, making it secret certainly increases patronage slush fund potential but it's not like that isn't already there, or like VCs are perfectly efficient investment machines who never consider their network or biases before spending LP funds, or had much role in many of last century's significant inventions.