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by sillysaurusx 1953 days ago
It's interesting watching /r/wallstreetbets oscillate between "We did nothing wrong!" to "Well okay, some people were doing some things that were wrong, but hopefully no one will notice."

https://www.reddit.com/r/wallstreetbets/comments/lj8djx/day_...

(I don't personally believe that anyone did anything that should be prosecuted here, but what I believe is irrelevant to courts.)

There is one thing that (in my un-humble, ignorant opinion) should be prosecuted: according to https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4RS4JIEVyXM&ab_channel=Benzi... the reason that trades were suspended is that the clearinghouse changed their requirements from 3% to 100% for GameStop specifically. And that clearinghouse settles 95% of all trades on Wall Street, so they effectively have a monopoly. Therefore that's why all the exchanges had to suspend GME training; no one had 100% collateral to cover GME for 3 days.

Everything else -- Gill getting rich, WSB posts, Citadel's bailout of Melvin, etc -- is just a distraction. I hope one day they bring that clearinghouse to heel, since it was seriously uncool for them to change the rules of the game with the justification of "we said so."

12 comments

They didn't change the rules of the game. The volatility and risk changed, thus the collateral requirements changed. Note: I am not a financial professional.

I'm not sure if anyone from wsb should be prosecuted; but I will say that if another hedge fund had tried to do what wsb did, it would have been clearly and unambiguously illegal market manipulation.

I do think it is quite likely there were some financial professionals posting on wsb that were breaching some laws or technical requirements. I have no evidence, but I would not be surprised.

Institutional investors did do what people suspect wsb of doing. Retail investors where net sellers of GME during this event. The short squeeze happened because other institional investors went in hard under cover of the WSB memes.

https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/05/gamestop-mania-may-not-have-...

> Institutional investors did do what people suspect wsb of doing.

Buying based on observing market conditions or seeing the posts in reddit wouldn’t have been questionably legal afaik. Only actively coordinating e.g. through posts on Reddit or phone calls or a Smoky back room could be argued to be market manipulation I think? If they were posting in Reddit to feed the squeeze that’s when stuff may get problematic.

The sentiment on WSB from what I can tell is that they can’t coordinate which thread to sticky, let alone which stock to buy. My impression of observing it for a couple of weeks is that this is true. They aren’t capable of truly coordinating anything.

Best I can tell, Roaring Kitty/Deepfuckingvalue basically had been buying more and more GME stock for like a year and every month showed screenshots to prove this saying a short squeeze was coming. Eventually in January something happened and everyone else was like “he might actually be right, I’m buying”. Then the news picked it up and it hit a positive feedback loop. Robinhood stopping buy orders put a wet blanket on things and after they lifted the restrictions enough time had passed that the frenzy slowed down. The short squeeze might still happen but lots of WSB participants bought at $300+ and I suspect will never recover that loss. But also because of this specific crowd it seems a good chunk of them are not selling on the idea that if you buy at $300 and sell at $50, you definitely lose. And if you hold the stock it might some day rise back to above $300-400. Mark Cuban did an AMA there where he basically reaffirmed this point of view which they took and ran with.

Part of this behavior is that WSB wasn’t really focused on going long on stocks until now. They mostly traded options which have specific deadlines. They simply aren’t used to the idea of an open ended investment. I saw people talking about how GME is a solid company and how they believe it’ll transition to digital successfully. How it might grow from fundamentals, etc. Nevermind their EPS, or the fact that their valuation currently sits at 10x what it was with no justification as to how their fundamentals might have changed to account for this. The difference with this crowd is that they for the most part acknowledge that this is gambling and that you are likely to lose all the money you invest so don’t worry about losing it. They also acknowledge that they don’t know what they are doing vs pretending like this is all based on research, experience, or education. Makes them a sort of dangerous crowd, especially as some there do accumulate a good amount of wealth, IMO.

But also because of this specific crowd it seems a good chunk of them are not selling on the idea that if you buy at $300 and sell at $50, you definitely lose.

So close! You're almost completely correct, but remember that a loss is considered a win on wsb, because you get to post loss porn. Can't spell trader without retard.

https://www.reddit.com/r/wallstreetbets/comments/ljde34/rip/

Your comment is excellent. But I just wanted to chime in with a "yes, but remember that they don't take themselves very seriously" type reply. It's necessary for preservation of their culture. People who act like they know a thing or two tend to get immediately jumped on, which I found quite refreshing. "But will a gamma squeeze happen?' is usually met with "stfu and go read a book rather than drop terms you don't understand."

Which ... seems unhelpful and awful, until you realize that it preserves the important property of letting everyone feel like they can participate. You, me, anyone. And I don't really see how that's a dangerous group; it's more like a virtualized casino meme factory.

> People who act like they know a thing or two tend to get immediately jumped on, which I found quite refreshing. "But will a gamma squeeze happen?' is usually met with "stfu and go read a book rather than drop terms you don't understand."

Maybe this is how it was 6 million subscribers ago. Based on my (extensive) reading of WSB the past few weeks, this is no longer true.

I've read just about every WSB post (and its comments) about GME with over ~1000 upvotes. People asking when the gamma squeeze is going to happen were definitely not being told to read a book, they were being told things like "this Friday!" And people acting like they had intimate knowledge of this fact weren't exactly downvoted either...

That’s a really interesting take. The way they seek the lowest common denominator of communication does seem to create a strong sense of community.

What I mean by dangerous is this: as more people flock there more capital will enter the market through that gate. And that’s a lot of money to be directed by whims of a fickle and undereducated community that tends to ride whatever is popular at the time. This time they pump and dumped GME, AMC, and BB. What happens when they do this to a different company like say Amazon? Anything good/bad?

that wsb is gone. maybe it'll come back after the dust settles.

it isn't all bad though - old timers migrated to a myriad of other subreddits where quality content is more popular. it may take a while to get back to late 2020 level of memes, though.

There are formulaic requirements based on volatility and risk, but those aren't specific to one stock. The clearing exchange exercised discretion in applying a new collateral requirement, and in doing so put its thumb on the scale.
Specifically the “Margin Liquidity Adjustment Charge”.
If they required 100% collateral, why did that mean Robinhood stopped trades? Why couldn't they allow trades with 100% settled funds?
This episode of Planet Money should shed some light on it. What I understand from this episode is that there's a 2 day delay in settling trades, that's why clearing house exists.

https://www.npr.org/2021/02/02/963466346/robinhoods-very-bad...

There is a two day closing period for stock sales. During that period the exchange needs colateral to ensure when the transaction closes it will be paid for.

Typically this collateral is small, like 3% because most stocks aren’t volatile and buyers almost always pay up.

But when a stock gets incredibly volatile, there is a risk that buyers of $480 shares may refuse to pay when the price is $90 two days later. Especially when the buyers are a bunch of new retail investors who just opened accounts.

You could buy GME from most brokers because they didn’t have the GME volume Robinhood had, and they had more collateral, so the 100% collateral requirements for GME were manageable.

And the inverse; if you buy at $200 and the stock is at $400 two days later there's a risk that the person you were buying it from has disappeared (maybe they were a short seller and went bust; maybe they got seller's remorse). So RH has to reserve not just the $200 you paid for it, but also another $200 to buy the share on the open market when the counterparty fails to deliver. That's why collateral requirements are based on volatility, not momentum.
Brokerages can't guarantee trades with client money[1].

[1] https://archive.is/GFtf2

I think the requirements were calculated at the brokerage level and not the individual customer level.
One level up, I think!

Think of it like a pyramid: the clearinghouse sits at the top, the brokers are in the middle, and the rest of us dirty peasants sit at the bottom where we belong.

The clearinghouse covers 95% of trades on Wall Street. So the clearinghouse issued a decree: "we are no longer able to support opening positions for GME, AMC, and KOSS."

Since most brokers use this clearinghouse, that means almost all brokers were forced to prevent customers from buying GME.

Everyone: pikachu face

The brokers have no choice. https://youtu.be/4RS4JIEVyXM?t=96

Not quite right. There's the DTC (which carries out 95% of the trades), then there's clearing houses (sometimes a seperate entity, sometimes part of the broker: the larger ones all do their own clearing. e.g. Robinhood has their own clearing house), then there's the brokers, then the traders. The DTC said 'we need 100% collateral on these trades' (probably because they viewed there being a significant risk that someone, somewhere, would not be able to pay up for the trades they're making in a big way), and then APEX clearing (which is the clearing house used by a lot of smaller brokers but not 95% of the market) said 'we can't support opening new positions' because their liquidity would be sucked up by the requirement, blocking most of the smaller brokers. Robinhood did similar for similar reasons independently of APEX, but some other brokers not using APEX could still trade (either because they had more cash on hand or because their customers weren't buying as much of affected stocks).
> The DTC said 'we need 100% collateral on these trades' (probably because they viewed there being a significant risk that someone, somewhere, would not be able to pay up for the trades they're making in a big way

This sounds like nonsense to me. After all the job of the Clearing House is to make sure the cash is balanced correctly after the transactions. Or realistically speaking a never ending chain of transactions, thus correctly moving the cash behind back and forth in time. It's the secret of the clearing house why they have no problems that their institutional customers have single digit equity ratios (speaking about Basel II/III/...) all the time while most individuals deal with 100% equity ratio. Maybe the more reasonable explanation is that they were overwhelmed by so many small transactions.

The Wikipedia article on DTC isn't very informative

What is the relationship between the NYSE and DTC?

I highly recommend https://youtu.be/4RS4JIEVyXM?t=60 -- I didn't understand any of this myself till watching that. (Still don't! But I'm less confused.)

My understanding is that the clearing firm informs everyone "Hey, we no longer support opening positions in three stocks specifically: GameStop, AMC, and KOSS."

Literally everyone, including Robinhood, was forced to only allow people to sell GME.

Somehow Fidelity was the only market maker to avoid this -- you couldn't buy GME anywhere else due to the clearinghouse's decision.

(Why was Fidelity the only broker able to sidestep the clearinghouse's decision? An interesting mystery; perhaps someone here knows the answer.)

> Literally everyone, including Robinhood, was forced to only allow people to sell GME.

Not literally. I was able to buy w/Schwab when it was restricted by RH. I tested this specifically to see if I should change brokers.

There's more than one clearing firm in the market. The more money the clearing firm has, the more likely it'll be able to continue trading highly volatile stocks at high volume. Fidelity, as a huge financial firm that's been around for a while, had the assets to afford to keep trading it (and/or their customers weren't trading enough to put strain on them), robinhood (which has its own, small, clearing firm) couldn't, simple as that.
No, buying worked on many brokers.
This is not true, you could buy GME at almost every broker except a handful too thinly capitalized to support their volume of GME trades.
Fidelity is largest stock holder of GME.
So in the end it can be done when the right people make profit
Or rather because the trades could be done internally (Fidelity could sell off the stock they own)

EDIT: It seems my assumption was incorrect. This link posted by grandmczeb shows that RH needed more capital by a downstream dependency to ensure those trades: https://archive.is/GFtf2

Fidelity is the largest shareholder in many stocks, it has a massive amount of client funds.
Interestingly from what I’ve read it seems like the hedge fund community overall views the GME event as fair play. ‘Maybe Melvin got burned but they should have known better’, kind of attitude.
The hedge fund community isn't really homogenous that way. Basically all the long/short equity hedge funds with appreciable AUM lost significant money in January, because most of them were short the...well, obvious short candidates, like AMC, GME and BBBY. Other kinds of funds which trade on monentum or which shorted near the top tick made an absolute killing.

Personally I don't think it's unfair when any fund loses money - that's the game. I do think it's unfair Melvin in particular has outsized attention. The only reason Melvin is in the spotlight now is because the WSB zeitgeist just happened upon Melvin's public short and fixated on it without looking at other funds' 13Fs showing the same position. Melvin was far from the only fund short GME. This in turn led the media outlets to hyperfocus on Melvin, which has in turn led the mainstream lay community to hyperfocus on Melvin.

Can someone please explain the situation to someone with no competence how these markets work?

As far as I understand, no one is allowed to trade on stock exchanges directly. Everyone has to go through a broker. Orders has to be settled in 2 days. So there are counterparty risks involved in both steps here. Is this where there was a problem? But the retail trading platform takes zero financial risk as long as they don't allow their customers to trade on credit (which is an entirely different issue).

As a retail customer I am entirely confident that I own whatever stocks has been purchased, even if the trading platform used should go belly up, as long as the stock in question is traded in a public exchange, which was the case here.

So what exactly was the problem? Some posts led my to believe Robin Hood and other apps extended some credit to its users in order for customers to be able to speculate immediately with their money and not have to wait for the trade to be settled. But surely the appropriate response to that would be to halt that credit, not suspend trading?

There is also the question how it is possible to limit buys or not sells? For every sell there is also a buy. If some platforms are limited to sell orders, someone must be on the other side of that trade, and will have an advantage in the market. How is that legal?

Or did this not concern stock trading at all? Some articles mentions options trading, which is a financial instrument issued by a counter party. But those kinds of orders are stopped all the time for all sorts of reasons. That is in itself hardly newsworthy.

I'm thinking it was a decision guided by their current application architecture. My guess is that there was no easy way to disable the purchasing of stock on credit, and preventing a stock from being bought was probably the easiest mitigation.
>Is this where there was a problem? But the retail trading platform takes zero financial risk as long as they don't allow their customers to trade on credit (which is an entirely different issue).

From matt levine:

>This means that the seller takes two days of credit risk to the buyer. I see a stock trading at $400 on Monday, I push the button to buy it, I buy it from you at $400. On Tuesday the stock drops to $20. On Wednesday you show up with the stock that I bought on Monday, and you ask me for my $400. I am no longer super jazzed to give it to you. I might find a reason not to pay you. The reason might be that I’m bankrupt, from buying all that stock for $400 on Monday.

>Generally if you buy a stock on Monday you still want it on Wednesday; even if you don’t, we live in a society, and you’ll probably cough up the money anyway because that’s what you’re supposed to do. But at some level of volatility things break down. If a stock is really worth $400 on Monday and $20 on Wednesday, there is a risk that a lot of the people who bought it on Monday won’t show up with cash on Wednesday. Something very bad happened to them between Monday and Wednesday; some of them might not have made it. You need to make sure the collateral is sufficient to cover that risk. The more likely it is that a stock will go from $400 to $20, or $20 to $400 for that matter, the more collateral you need.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-01-29/reddit...

Yes, so I take it to mean that indeed the retail trading platform (the actual term may be something else), takes zero financial risk. The broker that the retail trading platform uses to access the trading exchange takes this risk.

But the counterparty risk here is quantifiable (by way of audits of said retail trading platform) which usually in society makes it a case for insurance, not security payments. That is my question. Is the premise misstated, and if not, why is this not settled by insurance?

The three replies posted to the question above seems to disagree what the problem actually was.

In the financial industry collateral is normally used as the primary means of mitigating counterparty risk as it avoids adding an additional counterparty that you then have to evaluate for creditworthiness, and you have to pay them money instead of just temporarily handing over collateral and getting it back 100% later on.

That being said the collateral doubles as a sort of insurance; if one party's collateral is insufficient to cover the loss, the excess is spread across other market participants. This is one reason why client funds can't be used for this collateral.

The DTC changed the collateral requirements to 100%. The WeBull CEO said that. That requires way more cash on hand to handle settlements compared to the norm which I think is 2-3%.

IMHO the DTC and prime brokers are all pals playing in the same fixed game. My baseless assumption is they’re manipulating the market by selling uncovered shorts to each other and since everyone is in on it / accustomed to it, no one ever comes to collect so there’s no risk of having to cover their uncovered shorts. They could be shorting 2000% of the float and no one would know if all the trading happens between complicit participants with the sole intent of driving share prices down.

By "what WSB did" are you taking about a short squeeze? Those are not uncommon and no one has ever been prosecuted for it.

Or is there something else that WSB did beyond squeezing the shorts?

Organizing a team to do the short squeeze. Though you can quibble on “organizing” part when it comes to WSB.
The issue is that the volatility had been unprecedentedly high for a week, but they jumped up the collateral requirements overnight. It would be one thing if they'd stepped it up in time with volatility, but by the timing, it looks less like a protective and more like a punitive step.
“Therefore that's why all the exchanges had to suspend GME training”

As far as I know, no exchange suspended trading in GME. It’s only some brokerage, due to collateral requirements and risks involved, that imposed limits on their clients.

People should educate themselves about investing and trading before starting. I blame Robinhood for this circus - it’s pure gamification - I guess 90% of guys trading on it don’t understand what they doing, let alone what’s really happening when they hit this “buy” button. This is the point that should be investigated - do we really want people to be able to loose all their money in a matter of days and sometimes hours, trading options with leverage ?

Two types of limiting happened:

Some brokerages put a complete stop on trading the share - no buying or selling. Fair enough.

Others (this includes Robinhood, which I believe had the largest number of GME shareholders) stopped allowing purchases but continued to allow selling. One of their excuses is that they didn't want to take people's ability to exit their positions. This of course, played into the hands of anyone trying to cover their short, as it artificially increased the number of sellers compared to buyers.

Finally, Robinhood allegedly closed out positions of people who'd purchased GME "on margin" - the thing is, if you sell a share in company A, and buy a share in company B on the same day, you might be buying shares in company B on margin, because it takes two days to settle company A's share sale. So, even though you may think you bought shares of company B fair and square, RH could still have closed your margin position.

The collateral requirement was imposed because of the incredibly high chance of the stock simply collapsing again.

Trading halts in response to massive movements aren't unusual either.

Was a change in collateral requirement something that was known / codified in some agreement, or was it an ad-hoc decision?
> How a clearinghouse judges these risks, and therefore when it makes demands for more upfront funds, is typically formulaic. Margins can be based on equations such as value-at-risk. Exactly how the formula works, and who is responsible for losses in what order, are important elements. In the case of National Securities Clearing Corp., losses would be covered by the defaulting member’s funds before the clearinghouse’s own funds or other members’ funds would be used.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-clearing-demands-grounded-t...

WSJ says that it is formulaic.

No, they say it "is typically formulaic".

It's quite possible that this time it wasn't.

I'd say it's very likely that it wasn't formulaic this time, since Robinhood's CEO said in an interview with CNBC that we was called at like 4AM, well after markets closed, to deal with the new requirements.

Let's take a look at the formula.
It was an ad-hoc decision to go beyond the formulaic requirements.
I've only been sorta paying attention so i could be wrong but trades were not suspended or halted? only buying was prevented, and only for some brokerages?
> Only buying was prevented, and only for some brokerages?

The first part of that has been a common bit of misinformation. Opening new positions (either by attempting to buy shares of the stock, or entering into a new short position) is what was prevented. Closing positions (selling for owners of shares, or in the case of short obligations buying shares) was still allowed as closing reduces credit risk for the broker.

The brokerages that did restrict, were smaller firms and did so to maintain liquidity for all assets, instead of allowing a vast amount of their capital to be consolidated largely into a few assets, due to the increased capital cost of clearing.

Hasn't the largest brokerage also restricted?

Edit: OK, I think the list I looked at is wrong. I meant Charles Schwab, but I don't know which one is _actually_ the largest.

It's a fair question. A bunch of the larger guys like Charles Schwab and TD did implement restrictions as well.

In their case, it may not have been a necessity to maintain liquidity for other assets, but capping the exposure to how much capital they were putting down for it probably still made sense.

Charles Schwab did not implement restrictions.They had a banner until last week saying that when you log in.Stop spreading misinformation
Trades at the exchange level were repeatedly halted over the course of two weeks or so of the most volatile trading.

Trades by certain brokers or apps were also notably halted on a Thursday due to lack of liquidity.

Exchanges repeatedly halted for brief periods, based on predetermined rules. That part was nothing special, it's something like 5 minutes at a time,

Buying to open new positions was blocked by some brokers in response to the the bump in collateral requirements they were required to fulfill. Some brokers were capable of blocking only margin account trading, but RH sounds like they blocked all buyers (plus their target market is margin account holders)

DTCC is basically interested in ensuring that trade settlement occurs. They eliminate a lot of counterparty risk, but the flipside to that is that they clearly have discretion that surprises brokers.

It's the collateral increase that caused Robinhood and other no-fee brokerages to halt trading. Brokerages which had the ability to charge for trades simply required more cash on hand and charged slightly more for the trade.
but they blocked stock purchases alongside options, which makes no sense if the justification was collaterals for options
Stock purchases are settled after 2 days. If the buyer goes broke before that, the seller would be left holding to bag. To mitigate this risk you need to post collateral.
of course, but if you buy without margin the balance in your account should already be enough to cover the collateral.
But it's not the brokerage's money on the line, it's DTCC's. From the perspective of the DTCC, there's no difference between a retail brokerage buying $10M of GME and lehman brothers buying $10M of GME.
But if the brokerage already has your money they can use it to post collateral. And yet they banned everyone from buying. A lot of stuff doesn't add up here.
The "alleged fraud" described at the end of that post is not fraud at all. That poster either doesn't actually understand options or is misremembering the post in question.
NSCC collateral rules are widely believed to follow directly from Dodd-Frank requirements. It's also hard to understand the supposed conspiracy you'd be prosecuting NSCC for. Is the idea here that NSCC was somehow corrupted by agents of hedge funds short on GME?
"widely believed"? Believed by whom and why? Dodd-Frank is not a secret. There either is a requirement in Dodd-Frank act or not. If there is, you or the persons believing it could just quote the relevant text.

According to Vlad from Robinhood, as said in Clubhouse interview with E. Musk, there is discretionary (i.e. arbitrary) part of the collateral requirement set by NSCC.

Initially NSCC asked RH for $3 billion in collateral which RH didn't have and they managed to negotiate it down to $700 million, which they did have.

Which begs the question: if $3 billion was required by Dodd-Frank, then did NSCC commit securities fraud by agreeing to lower it to $700 million?

And if $700 million was enough to satisfy Dodd-Frank, then why did they ask for $3 billion initially?

And what if $500 would be enough? Or $200 million?

Or maybe Dodd-Frank doesn't dictate collateral requirements on an individual stock at all?

What you're looking for is Title VIII: Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Supervision.
You make it sound like the DTCC is some neutral 3rd party organization that isn't there to represent Wall Street.
Nitpick: your comment implies that the DTCC is representing Wall Street, but it is an understatement: DTCC for all intents and purposes is Wall Street. DTCC is owned by (quoting wikipedia here - sic!) "banks, brokers". It's a 6 minute walk from NYSE to DTCC (which shouldn't be surprising).

Given that, it isn't outside of realms of possibility that raising of collateral requirements had additional objectives other than simply limiting risk on the system (which, I should mention, was very, very real - in case RH went bankrupt). Normal people won't have any way to know.

Nah, no conspiracy. I just don't like that they can change their collateral requirement from 3% to 100% for specific stocks in one day, regardless of the reasons.

To turn it around: should they have the authority to enforce a 33.3x collateral increase with no oversight simply because they feel it's necessary for the world to stop trading GME? This is the heart of what I hope will be regulated.

BTW, playing whiskey slaps was fun. It was nice to see the crazy pentester world, even if I had wrong expectations going in. Hope you've been well!

I don't understand why you believe NSCC "felt it was necessary for the world to stop trading GME".
this one's easy: the financial world experienced a 7-sigma event for which institutions were unprepared for and somebody figured that it is worth pulling the emergency brake lever. for a few days GME was almost perfectly reveresly correlated with SP500 - there was a lot of derisking happening all at once. this couldn't all have been retail moving from SP500 to GME.
> It's interesting watching /r/wallstreetbets oscillate between "We did nothing wrong!" to "Well okay, some people were doing some things that were wrong, but hopefully no one will notice."

I feel like it’s mischaracterization to say that “/r/wallstreetbets” is either a single entity, or that the current group is at all connected to the “pre-GME” group. They had 1.7M users in Dec 2020, and are now over 9M. As well, there are undoubtedly bots, shills, and actors with their own agendas that were drawn as a direct result of the publicity.

"Therefore that's why all the exchanges had to suspend GME training" thats not accurate very few did. it's just that those few had oversized exposure on GME. They were also not part of some huge entity that could post extra money without even noticing like say Etrade (Morgan Stanley) etc.
Oscillating? It's multiple people!
The clearinghouse requiring more margin should definitely be investigated, but it’s not unreasonable. Robinhood offers margin accounts, and may have lent money to all the traders by GME at 300-400 dollars, over 10 times what it was trading at previously. It was completely plausible that Robinhood could have gone bankrupt, which means the clearing firm would have been on the hook for all of that money.

In my opinion, what needs to be investigated more is the “payment for order flow” business.

>Gill getting rich Did Gill sell? I thought he didn't convert his options yet and was still holding.
He continued to post daily updates of his held options until I believe 5 February, but I'm not sure what he did after that. I'm not sure if anyone but him knows, since that was around the time he was summoned by this committee.

As of that last update he was still holding most of his options, but it is believed that he had converted at least some of them and profited more than $10 million.

I don't have a better source than random Reddit comments, though.

there is only one core clearinghouse, the DTCC and they aren’t going to be brought to heel. they’re the ones who raised the leverage requirements
We don't need a clearing house at all. A simple blockchain fixes this and provides 100% of the settlement service that this company provides.
Replace “blockchain” with “mathy database”, then stop suggesting a database will fix non-database problems.