[db48x]

Your CPU can handle 39-bit physical memory addresses (up to 512 GB of physical memory), and 48-bit virtual addresses (256 TB). Your operating system maintains a mapping from virtual to physical addresses, usually arranging the map so that every process has a separate memory space. Pointers are all still 64 bits long though.

[barnacled]

In practice the actual available usable address space for userland is 64 TiB due to user/kernel split and the kernel maintaining a virtual mapping of the entire physical address space (minus I/O ranges) [0].

However newer incoming 5-level page intel chips [1] will allow up to 57 bits of address space, 128 PiB in theory though in practice 32 PiB of userland memory. See also [0] for discussion on practical limit for 5-page too!

[0]:https://github.com/lorenzo-stoakes/linux-mm-notes/blob/maste...

[1]:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_5-level_paging

[db48x]

True, though /proc/cpuinfo only reports the size, which is ultimately what the CPU cares about. Plus the most relevant limit is what your motherboard and wallet supports, which is often far lower.

[barnacled]

Indeed, and as you say, sensibly speaking you are hardly likely to hit those limits in any likely (esp. home) setup. The actual meaningful limit is usually the CPU physical one as home CPUs very often have stringent memory limits (often 32 GiB or so) and of course you rely on the motherboard's limitations also.

Having said that I did write a patch to ensure that the system would boot correctly with 256 TiB of RAM [0] so perhaps I am not always a realist... or dream of the day I can own that system ;)

[0]:https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-n...

[db48x]

You're not the only one dreaming; I had to use >200GB of swap on my home system last year.

[sigjuice]

So are the 16 leftmost bits of a virtual address always 0?

[db48x]

Oddly enough the unused bits are in the middle of the address. They're also sign-extended rather than filled with zeros, so sometimes they are ones and other times they are zeros.

[db48x]

In the middle of the address _space_, I should say.

[moonchild]

If you interpret your addresses as signed values, then the entire address space can be contiguous.

I'm not suggesting that this is a good idea, but is certainly an idea.

[db48x]

Negative addresses? Anathema!

[barnacled]

They have to be same as the maximum addressable bit, i.e. in the case of 48 bit virtual address size the 48th bit.

This is actually kind of a cute way of dividing kernel and userland space as you just set the upper bit to 1 for kernel addresses and 0 for userland.

EDIT: Specifically talking about x86-64 here.

https://github.com/lorenzo-stoakes/linux-mm-notes/blob/maste...

[amscanne]

No, it must be sign-extended from the top bit of the valid set. Otherwise the address is non-canonical.

[xxpor]

This is true for x86-64, not true for other architectures such as arm64.

Apple uses the high bits to cryptographicly sign the pointer value.

[haberman]

Hmm, it appears that the top byte on arm64 is only ignored if TBI (Top Byte Ignore) is enabled.

I don't think pointer signing requires TBI though. Pointer signing uses the PAC instruction to sign a pointer, and the AUT instruction to verify and unpack the signed pointer, but in its signed/packed form it is not a usable pointer. So actual addressable pointers need not support non-canonical addresses.

[saagarjha]

Apple runs PAC without TBI enabled, I believe.

[everybodyknows]

Fascinating. Does this confer some of the benefits of ECC RAM, for pointer data only — without the hardware cost?

[my123]

It's for a different purpose. (as in mitigate to some extent security bugs) And isn't an Apple feature only but an Arm one. (that is only rolling out on Cortex with Cortex-A78C and A78AE)

A paper on it from Qualcomm: https://www.qualcomm.com/media/documents/files/whitepaper-po...

And there's also MTE which is upcoming.

[danielheath]

Some (but I believe the advantage is that it’s much harder to inject valid code from a buffer overflow).

[saagarjha]

PAC is more about CFI than preventing shellcode injection (which is done through codesigning and memory protection, mostly).

[jcul]

Yes generally for userspace addresses they are 0. But more importantly they can be used for other stuff, commonly referred to as pointer tagging / smuggling etc.

It's a useful optimisation technique where you can add some extra metadata without having to dereference a pointer.

[dfox]

The reason why amd64 checks whether the addresses are “canonical” is discourage exactly this trick. On almost all platforms that simply ignored upper byte of pointer (m68k, s390, IIRC even early ARMs) this lead to significant compatibility issues.

As for storing tags in pointers on 64b platforms it is probably better to use the 3 low order bits. Another useful trick is what was used in PDP-10 MacLisp and is used by BDW GC: encode the type information in virtual memory layout itself.

[jcul]

I guess it checks it when you actually try to dereference the pointer? On Intel too you still have to "repair"the pointer before you use it. It's definitely not the safest optimisation but it can be used to great effect when needed.

I think Intel is adding CPU support for pointer tagging operations in the future which should make them a lot easier / safer / more efficient to work with, though I can't find a reference now, it doesn't refer to it as pointer tagging.

Any more information on encoding the type information in virtual memory layout? Sounds cool.

I guess you have different types allocated in specific regions?

[dfox]

Most general purpose ISAs (eg. SPARC and IIRC RiscV has something similar) with some kind of intrinsic support for tagged pointers also prefer the tags in low order bits.

And you are right that the tag inside address trick involves allocating objects of same type in different continuous regions. Usually such that whole page contains object of same type (as far as the tagging scheme is concerned) and by either masking off lower ten-ish bits of pointer you get to type header or you have some global out-of-line map of page frame->type.