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by aidos
1960 days ago
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If I understand this all correctly, that’s not how this attack works. You have no way of sending them a unique hash, because if you could, you would have identified them already. Instead, in this approach each request provides a single bit of information. There’s one part, where you write the hash and the user ends up with a load of fav icons in their cache. When you want to identify them (read stage) you see which icons they have. The unique collection identifies them. This is done by sending them to different pages, each with a different fav icon. During this phase you return 404 so do you don’t add more icons to the cache (so you need to be able to split between reading and writing). I didn’t see how they did that in the article, but I guess that’s easy enough by using a sentinel bit at the start (if they didn’t just request that icon, you’ve seen them before). |
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