[rasguanabana]

On one hand you have people setting wildcards in IAM policies for development phase (and forgetting to close them down afterwards). It’s hard to figure out permissions beforehand - this would help in these cases, but still taking IAM setup deduced from your traffic does not mean this setup is secure.

On the other hand you have complex architectures and no real overlap in their authorization patterns. It’s impossible to automate creation of secure "sandbox" setup for your specific use case.

You can’t really delegate security of your architecture to a single service - you need to address it yourself. Security can be implemented only in the service, not as a service.

[zackmorris]

Ya I've done that hah. I think an ok plan might be to set up infrastructure with open IAM rules and write all of the backend and frontend acceptance tests for an app. Then close all IAM rules and open them one by one until all of the tests pass again.

Maybe AWS could provide a way to track access attempts and then have an interface for the user to grant them one by one. I understand that this might be challenging to design, but I view these sorts of challenges as the "real work" of computer science, otherwise there's just nothing there.

I encounter that a lot when I have a preconceived notion of the heart of a strategy (including edge cases), only to find that it wasn't addressed, and in fact wasn't even mentioned.

Yes these things are hard, but Amazon has billions and billions of dollars.

[musingsole]

This is a thriving service market at the moment. DivvyCloud is an example: https://aws.amazon.com/solutionspace/financial-services/solu...