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by kasey_junk
1962 days ago
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Let’s be clear are you sending routed orders in this case? Are you suggesting that limit orders are filling but at a different price than expected or not filling at all? The reason Nanex is important is that they’ve made bank on proving that risk systems and broker latency don’t matter when enforcing reg nms. Neither does order volume. If you can accurately track execution to the point where you can see slippage (not on the broker report cards) you can make money on that info. None of that is to say different brokers don’t have different slippage just that in aggregate if you can accurately calculate it you a) have no business trading through a retail broker (and you know it) and b) there is money to be made in compliance that doesn’t take on trade risk. |
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Analogous to the PFOF situation...if a hedge fund sends a limit order to a bank the NBBO may have moved unfavorably by the time it gets sent down to a floor broker. That may be horrible execution but it's not illegal for a floor broker to suck at picking up the phone promptly.
I guess my point is that it doesn't take long to figure out which brokers can improve your committed price, which floors participate aggressively, which electronic crosses break you up, etc, and that knowledge can affect customer fills. But I get what you're saying and you're right that people could monetize it if they had hard quantitative slippage data. That wasn't really what I was describing.
>The reason Nanex is important is that they’ve made bank on proving that risk systems and broker latency don’t matter when enforcing reg nms
I don't understand what you mean by broker latency and Reg NMS...latency between different legs of SOR can affect execution even without a trade-through violation by causing the offer on Exchange B to fade if an order routed to Exchange A crosses the betters there well before the bid destined for Exchange B arrives. I think I'm missing a piece of the puzzle here.