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I feel like James had the deadline wrong in his calendar and this article is what "Right, sorry, I'll get it over to you by the end of the day" looks like when there is not in fact already a pretty much complete piece that just needs some polish but instead an empty Word document and half an idea in your head. Like so many people, James is pretty confident that anything he doesn't understand (including apparently elliptic curve cryptography) is probably unimportant, and that the solution to his pressing problems is just to make something he knows isn't possible easy (remembering a separate strong random password for every site) so the people who are working on stuff James doesn't understand ought to work on that instead. This piece was written, I think, slightly before BCP 188 ("Pervasive Monitoring Is an Attack") but to me it feels as though that's the answer to it. Yes, the NSA (or Mossad, but realistically the NSA) could definitely win if that's what it came down to, you or them. But that's very rarely the situation. Their budget, though large, is finite, and your value, even if large, is also finite. If snooping every word said on the telephone by an American costs 5ยข per citizen, why wouldn't the NSA do it? Worth a shot. But if it costs $5000 per citizen that's gonna blow their budget, and for what? So that's what BCP 188 is about, the question isn't whether you're dealing with "Mossad or not-Mossad" it's whether you are the Protagonist or just another extra. We can't make it impossible for a sophisticated and resourceful adversary to succeed, but we can make it very expensive so that they are obliged to choose their shots. |
The end result is that they split the type of surveillance between "cheap" blanket surveillance, and targeted surveillance for the targets that are deemed valuable enough, while also striving to drive the "per target" price down.
Mass surveillance offers a good opportunity for economy of scales, and gives you a very granular estimate of how valuable a particular target is.