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by sandworm101 1983 days ago
The person who perceives the non-existent person during the events is hallucinating. They are not acting rationally. If you watched them have a conversation with thin air you would call them crazy and generally untrustworthy. But the person who's mind creates the narrative afterwards does not hallucinate, they act rationally at the time and only later use the story to cope with post-traumatic stress. Note that these perceived people are generally helpful, as opposed to hallucinated people who are generally not.

People remember their guardian angel helping them climb out of a collapsed building. You don't see such people ignore firefighters to continue their conversation with the angel. That would be crazy.

2 comments

It can also help to remember that memories are far from totally accurate video recordings of an event. They are highly-lossfully-compressed, and there's some evidence that the act of recalling them is destructive, so every time a memory is recalled it is destroyed, processed, and re-written.

It isn't surprising that when a very out-of-the-usual event occurs, and the memory goes through this lossy compression and lossy storage, that when it is later reconstructed with the lossy decompression schema generated by a lifetime of "usual" experiences that it would result in phantom "usual experiences" being generated. It is very similar in process to those "deep learning" pictures that turn everything picture you feed it into bizarre mixes of dogs and sea creatures, because that's all that decompression schema understands.

> It can also help to remember that memories are far from totally accurate video recordings of an event. They are highly-lossfully-compressed, and there's some evidence that the act of recalling them is destructive

We have counter-examples of eidetic memory for vision, conversations etcetera so any model has to allow for near-perfect recall.

I think what parent is saying is that subjectively the experience of remembering an imaginary person helped them is not qualitatively different than the experience of remembering a real person helping them. As far as their conception of reality is concerned, someone helped them and for some reason there is no evidence that person existed.