[mqrs]

> If so, then why was the waitress not disturbed? It is not the cockroach, but the inability of those people to handle the disturbance caused by the cockroach, that disturbed the group. I realized that, it is not the shouting of my father or my boss or my wife that disturbs me, it’s my inability to manage my reaction to the words around me.

This sounds like a reference to stoic philosophy (of which I am not a fan), but I mean, don’t phobias exist, and don’t degrees of intensity exist so that it’s actually impossible to resist a trigger?

I personally used to be really scared of roaches, too, and I got over it not because I learned to control the fear itself, but because I thought about roaches differently (something along the lines of considering them weak). There is no controlling that fear because fear in this context is intense—I still get jerky sometimes when a cockroach shows up by surprise, or when there’s more than one of them, or worst of all, when they actually fly. I can usually avoid making a scene when there’s room to run somewhere else or if there’s an insect spray nearby, but stuck in a room with these triggers? I might go insane.

The conclusion that the women screamed because they’re not in control is not only lazy and prejudiced, it’s also an arrogant epistemological claim on something that the author doesn’t actually know, which is whether the fear or disgust of roaches is simply more intense for other people.

[praveenperera]

Sounds like you’re agreeing with Epictetus

“It's not what happens to you, but how you react to it that matters”

In your case the cockroach didn’t change, you found a different way to frame the cockroach. In turn you react to it differently.

[steve_adams_86]

I agree with Epictetus purely because I can’t change what happened to me, but I can make decisions about how to respond to what happened.

I originally had a hard time with this idea because people have used this “your response is your responsibility” excuse when being unkind to me, but the thing is, this mode of thinking doesn’t mean no one can hurt you and no one should be accountable for being unkind. It just means at the end of the day, you won’t benefit from dwelling on it and practicing seeking solutions instead is purely beneficial.

Once I separated the idea from the strict context of responses to what people did to me but anything the world could throw at me, be it bad weather or getting a great sleep or being given a gift or tripping myself down stairs, I realized it’s quite easy to apply and think about. It made a lot more sense without the loaded emotional, interpersonal context overlaid.

I figured I’d externalize this in case it helps anyone else, not trying to over-explain simple concepts to people :)

[cjohnson318]

This struck a chord with me. As a baseline, I irrationally feel like people can't stand me, but when I get pissed about something fall into what can only be described as resentment-spiral. The prospect of making up and moving on doesn't outweigh the resentment, and I just spiral down more.

Rationally I understand that me feeling bad and being resentful only has a negative effect on the situation and other people, but it's hard to break out of the spiral.

TL;DR What you wrote helped me out. Thanks.

[steve_adams_86]

> it's hard to break out of the spiral

Don't ever doubt that, it's incredibly hard. But it's something that deserves the hard work it takes to get out of it, I think. I've been realizing a lot of these kinds of challenges in life demand a lot from us, and it can be so daunting, but the reward of taking on that challenge is really immense. Imagine learning to get out of the spiral early - that one day you can just say no and focus on better things. You absolutely could, I bet.

> What you wrote helped me out. Thanks.

Thanks for saying so, that really makes my day.

I've had a similar experience and something that caught me by surprise was this technique called fear setting. I thought it was the cheesiest nonsense ever, but through some turn of events I ended up trying it. I applied it to a problem like what you're describing one day and ended up just writing, in the plainest, simplest, most honest terms why I fell into so much resentment. I'm sure it's different for both of us, but the experience was a revelation. Not all negative emotions are driven by fear, but the resentment certainly was in my case. So I wrote out why, what it does to me, what I can do to address that.

The key discovery was a sort of nested fear. It was like the immediate issue wasn't the real fear, or the thing driving my resentment. This should have been obvious I guess, because the superficial problems never justified the amount of resentment. No, ultimately I was afraid of addressing the superficial problem; the broad implications, the confrontation, the unknowns. I kept those tucked away so well and used that resentment to distract and convince myself that the REAL problem was the superficial once. It was really bizarre to realize that once I stopped to dig, the real fear and discomfort was right under the surface all along. Out of sight and out of mind, I guess.

Writing it out felt really stupid the first time. Like, I must know all of this already - why do I need to write it down? It's sort of like rubber ducking a problem though. You put it out there in plain sight and just go "OH... Oh.", and there it is. Now what do you do with it?

Tim Ferris talks a lot about fear setting. I don't know much about him, but he makes some sense on this topic. https://tim.blog/2017/05/15/fear-setting/

[mqrs]

I haven’t read Epictetus and I can’t tell exactly what he meant by that proverb, but the nuance that I can only react to cockroaches differently under conditions perfect to me must not be lost. That nuance is what’s lacking in the article and his judgmental explanation for the causality of the women's reactions.

[steve_adams_86]

Just curious, why aren’t you a fan of stoicism? If you don’t mind sharing some thoughts on it I’d appreciate it. I’ve been exploring it and I enjoy reading various takes on it. I’m not married to the philosophy and looking for a battle by any means.

[mqrs]

It raises way too many questions about where to draw the line for the concepts of control (as in the above example), detachment, and what is natural, and I don’t like inherently ambiguous worldviews because they become way too prone to highly subjective interpretation (especially true for stoicism when you try to apply it to the context of political and moral questions) and they create too many discussions that aren’t worth having (or, are only worth having with better-stated claims/philosophies that emerge from a mental model of the world that corresponds with what science confirms).

[estaseuropano]

I think it helps to see stoicism not as A philosophy in the modern understanding as something akin to a religion/worldview you have to buy into wholesale. It's more a practical guide how to live with many great ideas and some that are outdated/unrealistic. Engage with the ideas on their terms as 2000 year old thoughts and see how they do or do not serve you.

[steve_adams_86]

Thanks, that's all interesting to think about.

My experience with stoicism so far has been fairly different, but it might be because I'm cherry picking things I like. One thing I have enjoyed about it though is how objective it seems rather than subjective. I have a feeling if I delve more into modern stoicism I'll find more of what you're talking about.

> concepts of control

This one seems to me to be something like:

1. Anything external is out of your control 2. Anything internal is in the realm of possibility to control if you're healthy and willing 3. Having the faculties to control yourself is a gift/incredibly fortunate, and to hone that ability is very virtuous

If you lack control it's either because a) you're unable to due to some affliction like mental disability or sickness (not lacking virtue) or b) you don't practice enough (lacking virtue). I suppose there's room for a c) both a and b, too. This is where you're right - this becomes very subjective. There's a blurry, blurry line between hard, limiting disabilities and resolvable illness. I would say though that each of us can only do our best, and believe others are also doing their best. To split hairs on why people act the way they do would be pointless. Instead we should focus on supporting them to do better if they evidently need the help.

> create too many discussions that aren’t worth having

This has seemed to be something that's resented by a lot of classic stoics. Take Marcus Aurelius in Mediations here:

"Waste no more time arguing what a good man should be. Be one." - 10.16

"Be not a man of superfluous words or superfluous deeds." - 3.5

"[I’m grateful to the gods…] that when I had my heart set on philosophy, I did not fall into the hands of a sophist nor sat alone writing, *nor untangled syllogisms* (emphasis mine) nor preoccupied myself with celestial phenomena." - 1.17

Mind you, Marcus (to my knowledge) never self-identified as a stoic, though he was surrounded by and taught by stoics and his philosophy seems to pound on the 4 cardinal virtues relentlessly.

Here, Epictetus alludes to the futility of certain trivial diversions in philosophical debate:

"[...] What Nature is, and how she administers the universe, and whether she really exists or not, these are questions about which there is no need to go on to bother ourselves." - Fragment

"Be mostly silent; or speak merely what is needful, and in few words." - Enchiridion, 33

I think the problem of trivial diversion, specifically when it comes to subjectivity, is a widespread problem in philosophy and not necessarily specific to stoicism. I do think that debating subjective interpretations without some common good in sight or at hand is contrary to stoic philosophy.

Maybe what you're saying is undeniable evidence of the subjectivity being a problem, though. I certainly can't argue that, and I know others struggle with that too. It could be that I'm just taking what I like and silently rejecting the rest. I think this is why what many stoics did in taking what made sense from other schools of thought, purely because it seemed truthful, is still wise today. Many stoics weren't even opposed to slavery for example - it's clearly a product of a different time. I'm not sure that I'd ever identify as a stoic either, but I do enjoy a lot of what it has to offer so far. It's fascinating to see how much we're like people from 2000 years ago, too.

[lmm]

Not the person you replied to, but I started out liking stoicism and then realised it was pretty much just solipsism-lite. I think it's ok, even good, to actually care about real-world outcomes sometimes. The stoics say that you should care about whether you acted virtuously rather than whether your actions lead to a good outcome, but if you don't care about outcomes then the definition of virtuous actions must surely be baseless. If I really believe in stoicism, shouldn't I just take drugs that make me feel happy/satisfied/virtuous?

[Pamar]

I see you point but I think you miss something. Stocism was based on the idea that a human being is always part of a society and as such they have sn obligation to work as good citizens.

Therefore no, even if something more effective than wine had been available at the time, I do not think "taking drugs to feel happy/satisfied/virtuous" would be advisable.

Being virtuous was "being a virtuous citizen"; no matter if you were a slave or an Emperor. If anything they tried to teach you not to care about the conditions you were in (rich, poor, young, old...) and focus on the outcomes only.

( I do not consider myself an expert, but I mantain a small page about Stoicism: https://www.pa-mar.net/Lifestyle/Stoicism.html )

[lmm]

> Being virtuous was "being a virtuous citizen"; no matter if you were a slave or an Emperor. If anything they tried to teach you not to care about the conditions you were in (rich, poor, young, old...) and focus on the outcomes only.

But stoicism tells you to focus on this "virtuousness" in defiance of the actual outcomes: it tells you you shouldn't care whether other people acknowledge you as virtuous or not, or whether you succeeded or failed in a contest, as long as you acted rightly. I think this is actually a contradiction, because you can't decide which actions are virtuous through pure reason without regard to their outcomes; or even if you could, how would you ever know whether your reasoning was correct or not?

[steve_adams_86]

> whether you succeeded or failed in a contest,

I've never seen the result of a contest being something that really mattered in stoicism.

The 4 cardinal virtues don't seem to be relevant in any conventional contest I can think of. Maybe I'm interpreting your comment wrong.

> in defiance of the actual outcomes

Is that true, though? I think wisdom comes into question here, and if you do "virtuous" things with bad outcomes, it's not very wise and therefor not very virtuous. Good intentions with bad results are nice in that you meant well, but good intentions don't make us virtuous on their own.

[lmm]

> I've never seen the result of a contest being something that really mattered in stoicism.

Yeah, my point is that's explicitly given as an example of something you shouldn't care about IIRC.

> I think wisdom comes into question here, and if you do "virtuous" things with bad outcomes, it's not very wise and therefor not very virtuous. Good intentions with bad results are nice in that you meant well, but good intentions don't make us virtuous on their own.

At that point doesn't the whole stoic idea just become circular? The wisdom to act virtuously seems to be no simpler than a complete philosophy. And all of the rest of stoicism seems to depend on being able to know whether your acts were virtuous - e.g. if I acted virtuously but had poor results because of things outside my control, I shouldn't be saddened - but that advice is no use if I don't know whether I acted virtuously.

[steve_adams_86]

> If I really believe in stoicism, shouldn't I just take drugs that make me feel happy/satisfied/virtuous?

Not as far as I understand it. Virtue is fairly objective, and doing that for your own sake wouldn't be virtuous. Classical stoics believe humans are a social animal, and truly virtuous behaviour is pro-social.

> The stoics say that you should care about whether you acted virtuously rather than whether your actions lead to a good outcome

I'm not sure I understand this, but I doubt that's your fault. All I can think is that if your actions lead to a bad outcome, ultimately you didn't act virtuously - even if the intent was there. There's a sort of tricky spot in the philosophy which I don't fully understand yet though. Take Cato the Younger for example. His virtue and integrity stats were so buffed that he brought ruin to himself and those close to him, and history seems a little torn about it. Was it virtuous to stick to his guns and end up dead, or was that actually foolish and ultimately not virtuous because it served no one around him? I don't fully understand the classic or modern stoic take on this kind of situation.

However I do think in most cases that if your actions have bad (bad as in Stoic Objective Bad) outcomes then you didn't act virtuously. I suppose if it couldn't have been anticipated, then maybe you did.

> solipsism-lite

Interesting - my take is the complete opposite. I see it as though Stoicism describes the ideal human as quite selfless and pro-social.

> I think it's ok, even good, to actually care about real-world outcomes sometimes.

I believe this is actually all that matters in stoicism, since real-world outcomes are all that matter to the people around you. I could be wrong - I've just read a couple translated books and listened to some podcasts at this point.

[lmm]

> However I do think in most cases that if your actions have bad (bad as in Stoic Objective Bad) outcomes then you didn't act virtuously. I suppose if it couldn't have been anticipated, then maybe you did.

I think you're understating it; this seems to be a major point of stoicism, that you shouldn't be sad if your favourite pot was broken or your wife died or your fellow citizens denounce you and exile you, so long as you acted virtuously. You should only worry about what you can control, your own actions, not what you can't control.

All the stoic writings I've read seemed to take it as a given that you already knew what was virtuous. So if what's virtuous is solely a function of what's in your own head, then the whole thing seems solipsistic. If you define virtuous actions in terms of their results and their effects on other people then it wouldn't be solipsistic, but in that case stoicism seems to tell you very little about how to live; judging which actions are virtuous doesn't seem any easier than just judging what you should do in the first place.

[aidenn0]

I don't think stoicism rules out using utilitarianism as a basis for virtue. It's not contrary to either utilitarianism nor stoicism to say that if you act in a way that good things are likely to happen, you shouldn't beat yourself up because a freak bad thing happened.

[lmm]

> It's not contrary to either utilitarianism nor stoicism to say that if you act in a way that good things are likely to happen, you shouldn't beat yourself up because a freak bad thing happened.

I think that's very much contrary to utilitarianism, which says you should measure your actions by their consequences. If you did x and got a world with utility y where you could have done z and got a world with utility w, and y < w, that's the very definition (under utilitarianism) of a bad action.

[aidenn0]

I disagree. If you are playing poker, betting on an inside straight is a bad move, even if you happen to get lucky.

Similarly you didn't make the wrong bet when you lose to a bad beat.

Any non omniscient actor can at best act to maximize expected utility.

If you ignore a pattern of bad outcomes that would lead you to improve your estimate of expected utility, then you are out of bounds, but my limited knowledge of stoicism does not make me think that it is opposed to such self reflection.

[lmm]

Stoicism tells you not to worry about the outcomes that you can't control, only whether your own acts (which you can control) were virtuous. But it assumes that you can perfectly distinguish the two, and gives you no tools for helping - indeed I'd argue that it makes those judgements harder by discouraging you from trusting your emotions. So either it's no help at all (because judging whether your actions were virtuous is a morality-complete problem) or it makes you dangerously unable to detect any mistakes in your moral judgement.

[tome]

> If I really believe in stoicism, shouldn't I just take drugs that make me feel happy/satisfied/virtuous?

Are there any? Perhaps the tenets of Stoicisim depend on there being no such drugs.