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by liquidify
1983 days ago
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No evidence has every been shown. It is easy to site a lot of people parroting the idea that it came from Russia, but aside from some vague connections, there is 0 hard evidence. If you were an Israeli, Iranian, Chinese, etc... hacker, you would obviously tunnel through servers in foreign countries that were easy scapegoats. So even if there was actual evidence (which there isn't) it still wouldn't mean anything unless it could be tracked back to an originating IP and connected to an individual with a motive and without an alibi. The benefits of blaming things on Russia for certain political parties are obvious, but those politicians and media members continue to make claims while never presenting any evidence, so you really have to ask yourself what is more likely to be true; A bunch of vapid politicians self benefitting claims without evidence, or the far more obvious possibility that a group of techie people from some random country hacked an easy target for money. Occam's razor say it is the later. |
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During an active incident, attribution details are not published. This incident still has people responding to it, and potentially further impacted victims. Indicators of compromise are published to allow for entities to hunt for malware or evidence of breach within their environments, but details that directly attribute a particular strain of malware to a threat actor are generally not shared (at least with the general public). Publishing those details could cause the threat actor to change those details and therefore evade detection and persist in impacted environments.
Let's take the Google breach of 2009, known as Operation Aurora as an example (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Aurora). China was claimed to be the culprit at the time, but it was not until three years later that Fireeye / Mandiant finally published the details that were used to track and identify the threat actor as part of their APT1 report (https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/02/mandian...).
In this particular case, even though the known impacted entity count is around 250, around 18 thousand entities downloaded the backdoored version of SolarWinds and are at risk. Publishing attribution details now could negatively impact their response. When respected entities in the field make a claim on attribution, generally it is accepted as if those entities were lying, their service (and potentially some of their executives as they are publicly traded in some cases) would go to jail.
It's important to note that each responding team will have access to different data sources and be able to make different claims as a result. CrowdStrike declined to do attribution, whereas FireEye was more definitive with naming a group. This is likely as FireEye was impacted first hand and was able to capture indicators that are not public. (One of the steps of IR is containment, where you observe a threat actors activity to figure out where they are in your environment, so you literally get to watch them some.)
The people in charge of the various government agencies are politicians without experience in this area true, but they are briefed and educated by the experts that do have experience in that space. Likewise, Washington Post is known for vetting stories in this space carefully. At this stage in the game, it is highly unlikely it is not Russia, as this sales pitch is very similar to when Russian associated actors leaked the NSA toolset. It too was advertised for sale via bitcoin (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Shadow_Brokers).
Anyways, if you're interested in this space, go find your local incident response (DFIR) meetup and ask how they track malware families. IP addresses are probably not one of their best signals for who made malware or executed an attack.