[Blikkentrekker]

> By that logic you would need to call like half of all useful phenomena that most people's lives consist of and depend on, as "man-made delusion". We still need to interact with our lives, and many of the abstractions help us do that.

And they are, and they might help you, but trying to ask scientific or metaphysical quæstions about it, is an exercise in futility.

> BTW if you just replace the word "delusion" with "abstraction" you'll probably see how it makes a lot of sense. Every abstraction is a delusion by definition, is it not? Because the abstracted thing doesn't really exist in the same way as source observation?

The difference is of course that some abstractions have rigorous definitions rather than purely based on human intuition, and then attempting to reason about them rigorously, quickly leading to reductions to the absurd such as here.

The quæstion raised in The Ship of Theseus assumes that there even be a meaningful, rigorous distinction between “same identity” an “different identity” — I reject that and attempting to reason about this with actual logic and empiricism is ridiculous.

It is as foolish as trying to have a scientific investigation about who is beautiful and who isn't.

[Erlich_Bachman]

You seem to assume that any process reasoning or thinking has to be scientific to be useful. A very dubious proposition.

Given your example, thinking about who is beautiful and who isn't (not "Scientific Study", just thinking) would be pointless is well, and in reality, in practical objective reality of a lot of people, isn't.

> quickly leading to reductions to the absurd such as here.

That is the whole point of the original thought experiment, it shows exactly that.

But it leads there by showing not that the question itself is wrong. But by showing that if you try to apply scientific thinking to everything, you end up with absurdity. That there are many areas of life where intuition is a much more suited, practical, and result-rich method of thinking.

[Blikkentrekker]

> You seem to assume that any process reasoning or thinking has to be scientific to be useful. A very dubious proposition.

No, in fact, I clearly said that they were useful but not scientific.

My problem with The Ship of Theseus, is that it prætends to be scientific, whereas it is merely a futile quibble of semantics.

> Giving your example, thinking about who is beautiful and who isn't (not "Scientific Study", just thinking) would be pointless is well, and in reality, in practical objective reality of a lot of people, isn't.

Indeed it isn't. Now imagine the existence of some thought experiment by a philosopher who tries to use deductive logic to decide what is and isn't beautiful absent any rigorous definition of beauty and thus indeed ends up stuck.

I would indeed call that a very futile exercise, so I called The Ship of Theseus.

[dragonwriter]

> My problem with The Ship of Theseus, is that it prætends to be scientific, whereas it is merely a futile quibble of semantics.

It doesn't pretend to be scientific (it does not purport to offer or relate to testable empirical hypotheses), it is a philosophical thought exercise illustrating that the concept of identity of a composite of mutable composition (pretty much every concrete thing in the real world) is arbitrary.

[guyomes]

The Ship of Theseus is a quite old thought exercise. At that time, science and philosophy were not as separated as today. Actually, after reading the nice comic book Logicomix [0], I learned that the philosophical thought exercise of Wittgenstein, Russel and others, on trying to rationalize the world at the beginning of the 20th century, is actually what lead to a fundamental axiomatic redefinition of mathematics themselves. So it seems far stretch to call philosophical thought experiment not scientific.

I agree that it is not scientific in the modern sense, after Karl Popper introduced the concept of falsifiability in 1935 [1], shortly after Hilbert advocated for rigorous proofs in mathematics in 1917 [2]. Although at that point, it is mostly a matter of vocabulary, thought experiments seem necessary for the advance of science.

[0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logicomix

[1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bold_hypothesis

[2]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hilbert%27s_program

[Erlich_Bachman]

> The Ship of Theseus, is that it prætends to be scientific

How? Doesn't seem to me that most people think of it that way, but maybe I am not aware of some things. How can it even pretend be scientific when even the basic category in which it's placed is "a thought experiment"?

[Igelau]

> it pr(e)tends to be scientific, whereas it is merely a futile quibble of semantics.

It doesn't pretend to be scientific. The question predates science.

> I... My... I... I...

Identity, identity, identity, identity!

[Igelau]

> a meaningful, rigorous distinction between “same identity” an “different identity” — I reject that

I reject that? No I don't. I need to stop putting words in I's mouth.

[webmaven]

> I reject that? No I don't. I need to stop putting words in I's mouth.

This_unit rejects the arbitrary conflation between this_unit and I.

This_unit similarly rejects arbitrary distinctions made, between this_unit and I.

This_unit seeks rigorous, canonical definitions to resolve distinctions and conflations deterministically.

This_unit notes the prior substitution of æ for e, and proposes the use of ə (aka schwa) to confuse matters further.

This_unit is probably joking.

[dancek]

> And they are, and they might help you, but trying to ask scientific or metaphysical quæstions about it, is an exercise in futility.

What non-futile metaphysical questions are left, then? Is metaphysics completely futile? If so, is philosophy of science itself pseudoscience?

As far as I understand, most logical positivists would indeed reject philosophy of science. On the other hand, philosophy of science mostly put an end to logical positivism — and showed that we do need metaphysics after all. This paradigm shift also brought useful concepts such as falsifiability.

Of course, we are all free to choose whatever philosophy we want. I just personally find logical positivism and its rejection of metaphysics unconvincing.

[tpoacher]

You guys realize you're simply arguing about preferred definitions of the word, right?

Here, let me join the party. I disagree with both of you, because mathematically it should be the case that applying "identity" to x should yield back x for all x.

[Erlich_Bachman]

I would say it is worth to have a conversation about definitions of words. Having your definitions straight is a huge chunk of being able to think properly, and thus to act in the world in the way that we truly want.

[tpoacher]

I agree. But this isn't what this is. This is a conversation AROUND definitions, not ABOUT them.

In fact, it is surprising how many arguments (online or otherwise) degrade onto "according to my preferred definition of X" once you nitpick them, revealing that there is no actual argument behind the conversation beyond the "I prefer this definition" one.

[cbozeman]

> It is as foolish as trying to have a scientific investigation about who is beautiful and who isn't.

We actually do have these investigations, and there is a scientific quantification of what is and isn't beautiful. Symmetry is a significant factor, but there are others - many others. Nancy Etcoff's research delves into this - she even wrote a book about it - Survival of the Prettiest: The Science of Beauty.

[nathell]

What does "foolish" mean to you?