| My example probably wasn't the best as too much is already given away. It's more like this: - We have a manned aircraft - We have an aircraft that can travel above 60k feet - We have an aircraft that can sustain or exceed Mach 8 (EDIT: strike this part as it connects two facts already: "at that altitude") - We have an aircraft called the XF-42 - We have an aircraft based in Middle-Of-Nowhere, AZ - We have 10 operational aircraft of some specific type Any one (EDIT: or all) of those details may be unclassified, but as you start pairing them up classified information can be derived from it. Note that in this, somewhat better, example only one item identifies the aircraft (rather than my initial example in which both items identified it). Publicly it may be known that an XF-42 exists, even where it's based, and that there are only 10. Publicly it may be known that an aircraft exists which is manned, travels above 60k feet and over Mach 8. But the two sets of data may not be joined in public because that would give more information than desired (in particular, that there are only 10 indicates a limit on the capability of the mystery superfast and high altitude aircraft). EDIT: Regarding some of your other comments. If I spread the information out and tell you how to reconstitute it so you can make a cohesive whole, I've just obfuscated the classified information which is the same as leaking it straight up. Regarding "poisoning", this is how it's done. If you have a document with TS data, the document is TS even if it's a single line item surrounded by unclassified data. |