[jtgeibel]

> "These people" also couldn't allege fraud in Georgia if we had fraud-proof systems. It's not rocket science.

What evidence do you have that they couldn't? Plenty of people would make claims of fraud, even in a "fraud-proof" election systems. What would that even look like, in theory, let alone in practice?

What specifically out our current system leaves it open to the widespread, multi-state fraud that is being claimed by the president and others?

[woofie11]

... That we have touchscreen voting machines, without auditable source code, auditable hardware, or corporate transparency? That we have no real way to know they're at all running honest algorithms?

I mean, seriously. Look under the hood for five minutes.

https://xkcd.com/2030/

This stuff wasn't even controversial among most liberals pre-Trump.

[jtgeibel]

How does any of that apply to the situation in Georgia? Sure, the things you mention would be nice incremental improvements to Georgia's system and states that do not have an auditable paper ballot trail are very problematic, we don't disagree there.

You imply that liberals have changed their position on this post-Trump, but I don't think you'll find these suggested improvements controversial to most liberals. But what do you mean by we can't point the people of Georgia to hard proof? I fail to see how addressing even all of the points you raise would suddenly convince the president and his supporters. The existing measures don't appear to have swayed them at all. So I don't think it's productive to pretend like this wouldn't be a problem if only we had some mythical "fraud-proof" system.

https://sos.ga.gov/index.php/elections/historic_first_statew...

> Today, Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger announced the results of the Risk Limiting Audit of Georgia’s presidential contest, which upheld and reaffirmed the original outcome produced by the machine tally of votes cast. Due to the tight margin of the race and the principles of risk-limiting audits, this audit was a full manual tally of all votes cast. The audit confirmed that the original machine count accurately portrayed the winner of the election.

> By law, Georgia was required to conduct a Risk Limiting Audit of a statewide race following the November elections.

> The differential of the audit results from the original machine counted results is well within the expected margin of human error that occurs when hand-counting ballots. A 2012 study by Rice University and Clemson University found that “hand counting of votes in postelection audit or recount procedures can result in error rates of up to 2 percent.” In Georgia’s recount, the highest error rate in any county recount was .73%. Most counties found no change in their finally tally. The majority of the remaining counties had changes of fewer than ten ballots.