| This is nonsense. It's not The Marketâ„¢ or The Systemâ„¢. It turns out starving kids in Africa are of no value to anyone except to their parents, who have no means to provide commensurate to the child's value to them. The blunt truth is that arbitrary lives are probably nearly valueless and certainly worth less than $1000. I have tested this hypothesis by describing GiveWell's mathematics to people at varying stages before they would spend money similar to that: in every case, people choose to spend the money rather than save arbitrary life. I have tested this hypothesis on myself and it turns out that a pair of Zipp 606 carbon fibre wheels are worth way more to me than two African children. The "moral notion of value" is a nonsensical concept invented to reinforce the notion of self-worth while not contributing to anything. Test it on yourself each time you spend: is a human life worth more to you than a hundred burritos? a set of car tyres? the higher trim on your car? The magic of this method is that it's memoryless. Irrespective of whether you give a million dollars a year or ten, the question applies to the next one thousand. Your spending habits will prove it. No. Arbitrary life is valueless to you. And if you disagree, it should be easy to prove since GiveWell can save one arbitrary life per thousand dollars. Show me your spending and I will construct a way you could save a life by giving up non-essential parts of life. |
Listen to yourself. This isn't normal, but on markets, it is.
> The "moral notion of value" is a nonsensical concept
No, it's the fundamental concept. Economic value should aspire to approximate it if we want the market to be a force for collective good. To the extent that economic value fails to approximate moral value, the economy fails to serve our collective interests.
In CS terms: greedy algorithms fail hard in predictable ways.
> [So why don't you give more through GiveWell?]
Because I'm stuck in a system that's designed to punish me for doing so above and beyond the intrinsic cost of providing for the kid. Here's a counter-proposal: I'd absolutely sign up for a wealth-proportional share of a tax for ending world hunger. I'm not poor, even by HN standards, so this isn't cheating, but the fact that this formulation of the solution wasn't obvious to you demonstrates how thoroughly you've been trained to see the world through the circus-house lens of wealth-weighted utility, and just how perversely that lens distorts the world.