| > stabilize the plane Stability has a different meaning when applied to aerodynamic characteristics than they way you mean it (i.e. consistency). Stability in aerodynamics means if you push something off-center, it will return to center. Unstable means it will go further off-center. Unstable is like balancing a pencil on its point. The slightest perturbation will cause it to fall over. > Do you have a specific citation for this? Aviation Week 19-Sep-2019 " The MCAS activated twice, and the crew countered with electric trim. Unlike the JT610 pilots, the ET302 crew
flipped the stabilizer trim motor cut out switches, which stopped the MCAS from moving the stabilizer. But after
reporting not being able to manually trim the aircraft, they flipped the cut out switches on again. The faulty AOA
data was still feeding the left-side FCC, activating the MCAS again and putting the aircraft into a dive." (The airplane was already in a dive when they turned off the stab trim.) > It seems you're generally suggesting that the instructions provided by Boeing were sufficient for the plane to remain airworthy without further mitigation; this was contradicted by the ECAA and others. Is this what you're suggesting? Yes. In fact, on the flight immediately preceding the LA crash, the same MCAS problem was experienced, and the crew returned the trim to normal with the electric trim switches and then cut off the stab trim. They landed safely without further incident. Exactly what Boeing's EAD stated to do. |
But I have to disagree with your counter around airworthiness. Even after adjusted training, a plane crashed, and ultimately two planes crashed from the same issue regardless of the fact that the latter team was trained on the matter. At that point, the correction should be in hardware and controls, not in crew expectations.
I suspect we fundamentally disagree at this point, but I'm glad the rest of the world has concluded on the in the direction of correcting the plane rather than increasing human expectations.