[bawolff]

Its an active research area, there are proposals like helios https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Helios_Voting which check some of the boxes but aren't perfect . I'm sure cryptographers would love to come up with a fully scalable, trustless, verifiable, anonomous, coercion resistant system. But that's a hard set of properties to satisfy especially if nothing is in the physical world.

If you allow physical voting places, then just make a machine that gives a paper recipt and do risk limiting audits. Problem solved.

[chrisco255]

No, scan the full paper ballots with personal info redacted and make them publicly accessible so anyone can count the result.

[bawolff]

So you don't trust the machines to scan the ballots to count them, but you do trust them enough to scan the ballots so that the public can count them? If the machine is compromised the scanning step will be compromised.

Personally i think risk limiting audits of the original physical documents is a much more secure system.