Hacker News new | ask | show | jobs
by Boulth6 2010 days ago
> There's things like https://keybase.io that did try to solve this to a reasonable extent, PGP but more modern. It looked hopeful, but Zoom seems to only keep it on life support. Maybe someone will continue

It seems there's already Keybase like solution using OpenPGP only (no centralized infrastructure needed): https://keyoxide.org/

1 comments

Interesting, cool to see someone building a similar service to Keybase's account proofs. Hopefully they'll also build something like Keybase's proof integration https://book.keybase.io/guides/proof-integration-guide as well.

If you have any suggestions as to which E2E (group) messaging+fileshare+git platform I could use as a replacement for Keybase I'm all ears.

> Hopefully they'll also build something like Keybase's proof integration https://book.keybase.io/guides/proof-integration-guide as well.

As far as I've seen the proof integration is used only for Mastodon insurances and Keyoxide supports all of them by default: no need to ask for permission, no weird conditions to enter like, instance has to be bigger than N people.

I see this as a way to control who gets into Keybase. A perfect example of centralized control. The idea of programmable proofs looks good though.

> If you have any suggestions as to which E2E (group) messaging+fileshare+git platform I could use as a replacement for Keybase I'm all ears.

Sadly I won't help you with that. There are a number of services that want to eat Keybase's cake now but neither of them hits all points on my scale. So I'm using mostly several different services to get a semblance of the Keybase experience.

> As far as I've seen the proof integration is used only for Mastodon insurances

Just Mastodon a very narrow view of what could be implemented though. I saw alpha implementation for Discourse as well, before Zoom acquired them.

> no need to ask for permission, no weird conditions to enter like, instance has to be bigger than N people.

Yep that sounds reasonable, as long as we're not going to end up with a DoS because of too many proofs.