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by blurpesec
2010 days ago
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Some rebuttal: 1) There wasn't a rollback of the blockchain - the method to fix this was an irregular state change (I.e - at block z, change balance at address x to address y). This was only possible because the nature of the attack left all of the compromised funds locked in place for 30 days. Arguably, if it required a rollback of the blockchain, people probably wouldn't have gone along with it. (Though node operators and miners may still have as evidenced by the bitcoin supply bug and rollback in 2010) 2) The funds in the DAO at the time were roughly 14% of the total supply at the time. This is ~1.5x the amount of ether currently custodied by the largest ether custodians today. 3) The common argument of this event being a slippery slope and that it would lead to frequent recovery of hacked funds has turned out to be false. 4) Since the state change was introduced as a software upgrade, node operators (mining pools & infrastructure providers) all had to opt into the change - which a large majority did. This would indicate that most organizations and individuals were either in favor of this solution or were apathetic to the solution |
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