No it's not, Stuxnet was chosen as a path to mitigate the risks of a kinetic attack, as it that can't really escalate to an all out war whilst bombing nuclear plant can.
This doesn't mitigates any risks but introduces new points of failure.
You still need to get personnel into the country, and now it needs to be technical specialists that may not be as field experienced so now you also need an additional force protection element.
You need to smuggle in or secure more sophisticated technical assets which increases the likelihood of capture/discovery.
You need a longer staging period to manufacture, assemble and test this contraption which again means you are more likely to get captured.
You need to move that thing into place, secure a location close to the action from which you can operate, ensure that no one would discover the parked vehicle as this isn't James Bond and a remote weapons station is much harder to hide in the cabin than a bomb that can be easily placed in the trunk or the side panels of the door.
You need to be sure that no jamming would be put into place (cell and radio jamming is employed especially for VIP force protection to reduce the risk of IEDs) once the action starts or prior to it, and you need to be sure that your radio transmissions won't be intercepted, and we know for a fact that Iran monitors radio transmissions in an attempt to discover cells of foreign operatives because as they've already claimed to capture operatives using this technique.
And you still have the chance of this thing failing completely or partially, which means you either need to be confident enough in being able to take that target out again which in this case is highly unlikely (I'm pretty sure half of his security detail and staff are hanging from their ankles being tortured right now to find out who may have leaked any info about his whereabouts and daily routine) or have a team on standby to finish the job (which makes your A-Team contraption redundant).
Contrast this with Stuxnet.
Stuxnet can be developed, tested and fully validated anywhere in the world by simply building a similar environment.
While it can fail the failure poses no risk to personnel or to your forces, in fact the sooner it fails the more likely it could look like just another virus, Remember Iran didn't even find it out Russian, Finnish, and American cyber-security companies found it by investigating secondary infections.
It can be relatively easily inserted by employing social engineering, having a single asset on site or by the more likely scenario compromising one of the foreign 3rd parties that were providing some services to the Iranian nuclear program (e.g. that Ukrainian engineering consulting firm that is suspected to be the source of at least some of the infections) .
The malware itself wasn't nearly as complicated as you think, it was rather simple just nearly perfectly executed with very strong indication of the kind of operational methodologies western intelligence agencies employ.
This doesn't mitigates any risks but introduces new points of failure.
You still need to get personnel into the country, and now it needs to be technical specialists that may not be as field experienced so now you also need an additional force protection element.
You need to smuggle in or secure more sophisticated technical assets which increases the likelihood of capture/discovery.
You need a longer staging period to manufacture, assemble and test this contraption which again means you are more likely to get captured.
You need to move that thing into place, secure a location close to the action from which you can operate, ensure that no one would discover the parked vehicle as this isn't James Bond and a remote weapons station is much harder to hide in the cabin than a bomb that can be easily placed in the trunk or the side panels of the door.
You need to be sure that no jamming would be put into place (cell and radio jamming is employed especially for VIP force protection to reduce the risk of IEDs) once the action starts or prior to it, and you need to be sure that your radio transmissions won't be intercepted, and we know for a fact that Iran monitors radio transmissions in an attempt to discover cells of foreign operatives because as they've already claimed to capture operatives using this technique.
And you still have the chance of this thing failing completely or partially, which means you either need to be confident enough in being able to take that target out again which in this case is highly unlikely (I'm pretty sure half of his security detail and staff are hanging from their ankles being tortured right now to find out who may have leaked any info about his whereabouts and daily routine) or have a team on standby to finish the job (which makes your A-Team contraption redundant).
Contrast this with Stuxnet.
Stuxnet can be developed, tested and fully validated anywhere in the world by simply building a similar environment.
While it can fail the failure poses no risk to personnel or to your forces, in fact the sooner it fails the more likely it could look like just another virus, Remember Iran didn't even find it out Russian, Finnish, and American cyber-security companies found it by investigating secondary infections.
It can be relatively easily inserted by employing social engineering, having a single asset on site or by the more likely scenario compromising one of the foreign 3rd parties that were providing some services to the Iranian nuclear program (e.g. that Ukrainian engineering consulting firm that is suspected to be the source of at least some of the infections) .
The malware itself wasn't nearly as complicated as you think, it was rather simple just nearly perfectly executed with very strong indication of the kind of operational methodologies western intelligence agencies employ.