[lucasjung]

If wikileaks knows so little about their sources, how do they establish the legitimacy of the documents they receive? In other words, what's stopping me from using previously leaked documents as a sort of "style guide" for forging new documents and then "leaking" them to wikileaks?

EDIT: I should point out that, in practice, somebody from the originating organization inevitably confirms the authenticity of the leaked documents through contacts with more traditional journalists. But what would happen if a set of documents were leaked and nobody was able to confirm them?

[hugh3]

Very little. And one day this will happen and it'll be a major wake-up call for leak journalism.

[georgieporgie]

There's a humorous example of verification given in Assange's TED conversation, starting around the twelve minute mark: http://www.ted.com/talks/julian_assange_why_the_world_needs_...

[lucasjung]

This still leaves open the question: what happens if nobody can or will verify? What if the company in the cited incident had instead played the line: "We want to know who gave you those documents because they are fraudulent and we want to pursue libel action against the party who released them," or even, "if you don't turn over the source, we'll pursue libel action against wikileaks."

Alternately, what if a set of documents really are forged, but it's an inside job? The same person or persons who "leak" the document to wikileaks could then "verify" it to journalists "on condition of anonymity." The journalists would know that their sources are from the appropriate organization, but nobody would have all of the information necessary to connect the dots that the leaker and the verifier are the same person or group. I could definitely see this being used as part of a corporate power struggle (make a rival look bad, get him fired; or do the same to your boss) or a political struggle in government (use politically sympathetic career bureaucrats to generate a scandal for an incumbent six weeks before election day).