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by Paul-ish
2045 days ago
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The piece seems to be arguing from a general principle. Repudiation is a feature of most secure messaging applications and it is a feature that should be introduced to GMail. This argument doesn't fully address how technologies are actually used today. As far as I can tell, people who need repudiation are already using apps that have repudiation (eg Signal), because they know they are in a vulnerable position. The people who need repudiation already have it. So far we have seen DKIM authentication used against individuals in positions of power. With things as they are, cryptography is leveling the playing field by empowering the vulnerable while holding those in power responsible. If this situation or balance were to change perhaps it would make sense to rethink DKIM non-repudiation. I understand this is an opinionated/political take on cryptography that not everyone would share. |
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Can you really not think of a scenario where non-repudiation could be important even to people "not in power"?