| This is actually the perfect answer to this. I mean, technically, mozilla's ca-certificates tracker is the biggest attack vector on the internet's infrastructure [1]
and TLS transport encryption relies heavily on identification mechanisms which are recorded, verified and stored in a manner that a lot of third parties have to be trusted, too. Even when ignoring that salesforce is a private entity with financial motivations, and that the server is hosted on 17 years out of date OSes, I wouldn't trust any single entity with a responsibility like this. Maybe the UN, but nothing below that, and I think a legislation for this would be the "most correct" approach. I hope that in future (given tlsnotary works in the peer to peer case) this can be solved with content based signatures instead of per-domain-and-ip based certificates. I mean, a snakeoil cert has to be assumed to be just as legit as a cross-signed cert these days due to the lower feasibility of letsencrypt certs. Certificate pinning was a nice approach from the statistical perspective, but with letsencrypt taking over this is only valid for 3 months (max) until the pinned cert will lead to a required reverification. [1] https://ccadb-public.secure.force.com/ |