|
|
|
|
|
by SiempreViernes
2062 days ago
|
|
They make qualitative arguments, nobody has any realistic prediction of what the probabilities are. And the problem has never been making new theories, the problem is always that we have a very good model, and no principled way for choosing between all the possible theories that gives rise to almost precisely that model. So people tried to invent reasons and so far nobody has had any luck. And Hossenfelder is correct that in hindsight naturalness wasn't a very good rule. But by the same hindsight, no theory that could be detected in previous experiments would have worked either. In this view, making the experiments at all was a complete waste, we should just have drawn the winning theory from a hat and stopped all further work. |
|
If we have a theory that could solve the measurement problem (or detect quantum gravity etc.), and a plausible experiment for that theory, we should perform this experiment - it may well yield valuable data whatever result we get.
Conversely, if we have a theory that predicts that more particles may exist at higher levels of energy and nothing else, then there is no good reason to perform this experiment. Especially if the precise level of energy is a free parameter of the theory, so the theory won't change if the experiment fails.
> And Hossenfelder is correct that in hindsight naturalness wasn't a very good rule.
I believe that she is correct that naturalness wasn't a very good rule at all, not just in hindsight. It's as good a rule as it would have been to expect all numbers to be multiples of Pi.