WRT the 2006 financial crisis, there were about 10-20 regulatory agencies that had the power/responsibility to maintain stability. Each of them failed, but none were held to account; they each just made some excuses, and demanded more power and money.
Every time there's a crisis, the relevant regulator is exonerated of any responsibility, so their incentives are even weaker than those of the executives getting bailed out.
I agree. In addition regulators have zero incentives to serve the interests of the regular people. They do, however, have a huge incentive to block the market for the new competition (aka regulatory capture) and then comfortably rest and vest in a major corporation after quitting their government job with full benefits.
WRT the 2006 financial crisis, there were about 10-20 regulatory agencies that had the power/responsibility to maintain stability. Each of them failed, but none were held to account; they each just made some excuses, and demanded more power and money.
Every time there's a crisis, the relevant regulator is exonerated of any responsibility, so their incentives are even weaker than those of the executives getting bailed out.