[A_No_Name_Mouse]

I can see how that works for an internal network. How does this work for SaaS solutions that would normally be directly on the internet? Would they have to be "shielded" to be on a private network and somehow be "Boundary enabled"?

And could this be done in a way that is completely transparent to the user (without them having to start a connection to the worker first, and then make a connection to the desired service)?

[jefferai]

Generally speaking this is designed for accessing your own systems, not the systems of a third party being consumed as a SaaS. That said, any such provider that allows you to restrict the set of IPs allowed to make calls to the service would operate in a Boundary-friendly mode.

[pliu]

It would be interesting if the networking model for the end targets could also be inverted, so that an agent (or something) on the end target could make an outbound connection to establish a reverse tunnel to the proxy that user connections could then be sent over.

The use case I'm thinking of is for IoT or robotics, where you have devices you want to manage being deployed into remote networks that you don't have much control over. It's really helpful in this situation if devices make outbound connections only, so that network operators don't have to configure their firewalls to port forward or set up a VPN.

Edit: clearer language

[jlgaddis]

It seems like using WireGuard on the "end target" to automatically connect to (WireGuard on) the proxy would be an easy workaround.

I did basically the same thing years ago for remote console devices deployed inside various customer networks where I had little or no control over the network. At that time, I used OpenVPN to automatically connect back to our "VPN servers" -- providing access to the device even if it was behind two or three layers of NAT (which, unfortunately, wasn't uncommon!).

[victorhooi]

Second this!

CloudFlare Access allows this, using the cloudflared daemon, which acts as a reverse proxy. It essentially means the endpoint can be closed off to incoming connections from the internet, and you don't need to maintain various firewall whitelist (and hope they don't go out of sync)

Is something like this on the roadmap for Boundary?

[jefferai]

Without committing to any specifics, I'll say that we are very aware of use-cases where a daemon on the end host can provide enhanced benefits.

As you can imagine we did quite a bit of research with our existing users/customers while working on the design of Boundary. One thing we heard almost universally was "please don't require us to install another agent on our boxes". So we decided to focus initially on transparent use cases that only require running additional nodes (Boundary controller/worker) without requiring additional software to be installed/secured/maintained on your end hosts.

> the endpoint can be closed off to incoming connections from the internet, and you don't need to maintain various firewall whitelist

If you think about this a bit differently, a Boundary worker is also acting as a reverse proxy gating access to your non-public network resources. You can definitely use Boundary right now to take resources you have on the public Internet, put them in a private-only subnet or security group, and then use a Boundary worker to gate access. It's simply a reverse proxy running on a different host rather than one running on the end host. You wouldn't _need_ to add a firewall to ensure that only Boundary workers can make incoming calls to the end hosts, it's simply defense in depth.