[WorldMaker]

> Often that is way too much time--25 to 50 years in many cases, since those are the time frames for declassification of classified information

That's only part of what I mean about the goal to demand expanding oversight, maybe those timeframes are too long, but the point is that those time frames sometimes serve a useful purpose to slow things down for safety of parties involved or other reasons. A goal should be to find a healthy "medium" where "Surveillance FOIA 2.0" still allows for transparency/oversight/review without hobbling the process, and FOIA was just one example of an existing transparency tool to model from, it's not the only tool/model it was the first example to mind, but you would hopefully expand to a larger suite of transparency/sousveillance ("watch the watchers") tools.

I'm also not claiming that we shouldn't fight surveillance attempts, simply that where surveillance seems inevitable/a foregone conclusion/rough to fight that we also need to devote resources to fighting for increased sousveillance/transparency, because power will always abuse surveillance.

[pdonis]

> where surveillance seems inevitable/a foregone conclusion

To me, breaking perfect encryption by putting backdoors in computer algorithms is precisely the kind of place where we should not think that surveillance is inevitable/a foregone conclusion, but should draw a line in the sand and say that no, we're not going to accept this, law enforcement simply needs to up its game and figure out how to operate in this new environment where anyone who wants to can use perfect encryption.