Breaking a 1024-bit RSA key for SSH is a lot of effort for a very minimal reward.
The benefit if you do this is now you can impersonate the key's owner for new connections. So if it's a host key you can pretend to be that host if you're able to get on path between a victim and the real host, if it's a user key you can log in as that user with public key authentication.
But that's an active attack and an expensive key break.
Breaking 1024-bit RSA for HTTPS servers was a much juicier target because you can passively snoop RSA kex in TLS 1.2 and older. But that's not a thing in SSH, it's active attacks only.
RSA 1024 is still almost perfectly secure in practice. Something like the NSA might be able to break it only after the expenditure of years of work and zillions of dollars.
But beside the point as we are talking about RSA 2048 here which is in fact "perfectly secure" and the public key is not the part subject to downgrade attacks.