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by JohnStrangeII
2096 days ago
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This is a rather interesting article. I'm a Platonist. From what we know today, real numbers cannot exist in a finite space, but they seem to exist mathematically. The same can be said about many other mathematical structures, including those that can only be characterized adequately (categorically) in higher-order logic. It's also worth noting that physical and mathematical existence are based on completely different criteria. For non-constructionists mathematical objects exist once they are not demonstrably contradictory (although the absence of contradictions often cannot be proved in an absolute sense). In contrast to this, for physicists an object exists once it can be measured, where measurement is ultimately tied to sensual experience. There are also theoretical entities in physics that cannot be directly measured, but their existence is usually downplayed, they're not supposed to "really" exist but only as theory-dependent entities. In any case,the two "kinds of existence" are very different from each other. |
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You cannot show me threeness. You can show three things and tell me to generalise, and if you keep generalising you'll end up with a consistent-ish framework of sorts for your observations that can be applied to certain other physical experiences.
But fundamentally this is an exploration of the consequences of psychological processes - like perceptual grouping, and inductive relationship inference - not observations of external phenomena.
It doesn't seem that way, but there is no external authority you can appeal to which will state definitively that when mathematicians all agree on something their experience of "true" is absolutely and objectively correct, and not a distorted and limited artefact of human cognition.