| From TFA, here's the damning telegram bit: For Telegram, the researchers found that its contact discovery service exposes sensitive information even about owners of phone numbers who are not registered with the service. For Signal, TFA makes it clear that correlation defeats Signal's privacy measures: Interestingly, 40% of Signal users, which can be assumed to be more privacy concerned in general, are also using WhatsApp, and every other of those Signal users has a public profile picture on WhatsApp. Tracking such data over time enables attackers to build accurate behavior models. When the data is matched across social networks and public data sources, third parties can also build detailed profiles, for example to scam users. ... More privacy-concerned messengers like Signal transfer only short cryptographic hash values of phone numbers or rely on trusted hardware. However, the research team shows that with new and optimized attack strategies, the low entropy of phone numbers enables attackers to deduce corresponding phone numbers from cryptographic hashes within milliseconds. It is hard to say how Signal can improve upon these attacks other than to not use phone numbers at all. |
If Alice and Bob are in the same chat
and
Bob has Alice's number stored in their phone's contacts list
and
Bob refers to Alice in the chat (using @Alice)
then
Telegram will disclose to all the chat participants whatever name Bob has stored for Alice in their contacts (instead of the name Alice specified in their Telegram profile)