[vorpalhex]

All systems do have flaws. Even if we had very intrusive security, 9/11 may have still happened. It's possible no amount of security could have prevented it.

And it's possible in attempting to launch several thousand pounds of metal into the air that sometimes your testing is off and people die. That may mean the system is broken, it may mean it's just imperfect - it is not sufficient for either of those claims by itself. That people died does not mean the system is inherently broken - life is not without risk nor should our goal be to make that risk non-existent.

Security, to use your example, is fundamentally a trade off - accessibility vs security. Are we willing to trade a more intrusive screening process to prevent some set of attacks? Even if we make that tradeoff and an attack still happens, should we keep it? Would you be willing to be stripped search each and every time you fly if it lowered that risk of an attack another 10%?

Your call out of an ad hominem is incorrect. Parent is generalizing human behavior in an uncertain world, not attacking you as an individual. Nobody can write a perfect system, even NASA has failures. A super abstract argument about flawless systems loses to real life statistics every time - theory is great but only reality matters.

[dclowd9901]

I think we must reiterate to help you “get” it. One accident is a tragedy, a sign of imperfection, and we allow for accidents in most cases.

The difference between an accident and what happened here is that the issue was caused _deliberately_ by a series of bad choices, reflected in the fact it happened twice in exactly the same way. Yes, it took a lot of bad choices to get to the point of creating the issue, but that doesn’t really matter, and in fact, might only serve to further the point.

When a system allows for deliberate choices to cause an issue, the system needs to be addressed.

Anecdotally, I have never worked at a company where the management didn’t have an outsized say in how we broke apart our time between product development and stability.

I suspect this is endemic of a system that lacks accountability for people in managerial positions, and is probably even beyond the scope of the FAA, MCAS or Boeing.

[vorpalhex]

> I think we must reiterate to help you “get” it

Have you considered you may not be correct here? I know that may be difficult to comprehend, but you are not a teacher shedding light on the unenlightened - you're just another layperson attempting to understand a complex system.

> what happened here is that the issue was caused _deliberately_ by a series of bad choices

Are you suggesting Boeing intentionally downed it's own planes? That would seem to be an extraordinary claim - and not one reflected by any news source.

> When a system allows for deliberate choices to cause an issue, the system needs to be addressed.

What was the deliberate choice here? Only enabling one MCAS sensor or having calibration issues? Was it not making the need to disable the MCAS sensor in some situations clear? Was it changing the altitude model without changing the plane model number and forcing a pilot relicense?

Or, was the issue with Boeing being able to do their own testing? Was it due to a lack of guidelines on MCAS sensor calibration and placement?

> I suspect this is endemic of a system that lacks accountability...

Yet we are talking about this after their fleet was grounded, a congressional inquiry has happened and the investigation and analysis are ongoing. That doesn't seem like a lack of accountability to me.

Again, you're making the claim that the system is broken intrinsically because this occurred. You keep even saying it's deliberate - do you have evidence here? Because making poor choices is not the same as intent, and a bad actor does not a fundamentally broken system make. You seem to be in the position that because bad things happened we must dismantle the entire system without actually proposing a replacement - it is not enough to throw stones, we must actually put forth a solution set.