[saagarjha]

Perhaps Apple has some sort of model where this is helping, but as it stands this makes the lives of security researchers and jailbreakers annoying and it does not close a hole that previous attacks were using (they are still using the same techniques!) Neither of your examples involve patching the kernel–the first is finding a bug in iMessage in userspace, and the second is handled by an entirely separate chip. My perspective is literally just "I want Apple to prevent exploits against my iPhone, and also not make jailbreaking worse for no reason" and this feature is "makes exploits no harder because no attacker cares that this exists" and "makes jailbreaking way more annoying". There's no balance between the two here, it's just negatives all around.

[pvg]

I didn't say either of these patched the kernel (one is in userspace, the other one is, well, you don't know where it since I didn't describe one) just that the difficulty and complexity of some potential exploit doesn't mean the exploit isn't important both to Apple and end-users.

You were arguing that some of Apple's mitigations are only aligned Apple's business interests and not those of end-users. I don't think you've said much to really show this is true, other than in your specific case. Not wanting the phone to be jailbreakable, to provide some assurance that when you buy an Apple phone, it's running Apple's software as designed by Apple and that it can't easily and surreptitiously replaced with something else is a perfectly reasonable consumer expectation very much in line with what Apple explicitly sells and promises of the product and services it comes with. The 'for no reason' bit just seems obviously inaccurate.