[nodamage]

> My feeling is that a different analogy would better suit your argument.

Feel free to pick whatever example you'd like, the underlying point is the same: just because some bad actors will ignore the regulations anyways doesn't mean we shouldn't have the regulations in the first place or the regulations have no net benefit. In other words, pointing to a few counter examples and saying "gotcha! your regulation didn't perfectly prevent everything!" is not a meaningful critique.

> So I'm not really swayed by someone saying that the only way to prevent malware is if Apple/Google ban porn, and decide for users which payment methods they're allowed to use in an app, and decide whether or not online game streaming apps are allowed to enter the market, and decide whether or not serious games like Sweatshop can be considered art, and decide whether or not podcast apps will be allowed to include COVID podcasts in their directories.

I generally agree that these examples are overly restrictive and unnecessary. However, I don't think legally forcing manufacturers to open up their devices to side-loading is the appropriate remedy, because it increases the level of risk from bad actors attempting to exploit those devices.

I also think Hacker News posters have a tendency to underestimate/downplay those risks because as highly technical people they know what to do to avoid those risks - but the same does not apply to the vast majority of users.

[danShumway]

We might be arguing past each other. I agree that cherry-picking doesn't mean that a system should be immediately discarded. But in my mind, the point of bringing up individual malware examples is not to say that all regulation is worthless, it's to drive home that perfect security doesn't exist, that we shouldn't be striving for perfect security in the first place, and that the real world is about balancing security with other concerns.

I don't understand what makes your argument different from, "I don't think allowing encryption is a good thing, because it increases the level of risk from terrorists and traffickers." There is no such thing as a malware free world, and saying, "this would increase malware" is not an immediately persuasive argument.

In other words, if your angle is that you're worried about people cherry-picking counter-examples, my angle is that I'm worried about people pointing at every single security restriction and saying it's critically important, regardless of what it costs users.

We're talking about abandoning a fundamental user right. I need to see stronger evidence that the security gain is so large that it justifies getting rid of that right. The reason your comparison to the government stuck out to me is because it's the same faulty reasoning that the government uses all the time to say that any increase in citizen security or rule enforcement is worth pursuing, regardless of what it means for citizen autonomy.

> I also think Hacker News posters have a tendency to underestimate/downplay those risks

What are those risks? You want to get rid of cherry-picking, what kind of change in malware would we be talking about if we got rid of sideloading on Android or introduced it on iOS? The best data I'm seeing online suggests possibly an impact to 0.5% of current devices based on Android statistics, and that's assuming we can't get any other gains from sandboxing and user-education.

Frankly, even assuming that we couldn't reduce that number farther, that's not a number that's big enough to justify abandoning a user's fundamental right to control what code runs on their device. Especially when we have good evidence that in the absence of that right, companies like Apple will both censor and use their power to control the market and target competitors.

> I don't think legally forcing manufacturers to open up their devices to side-loading is the appropriate remedy

I'm open to lots of solutions here, some regulatory and some market-based. We don't need to focus on just sideloading if there are other solutions other people find more palatable (<cough>Repeal the DMCA</cough>).

But even on the topic of sideloading, I'm open to the idea that this doesn't need to be a general regulation. I'm fine with saying that Apple is in a unique position because it's one part of a duopoly, and that we don't have to make a generalized rule for every company just to target Apple/Google specifically. My position isn't necessarily that manufacturers all need to be forced to open up their devices, it's that it might make sense to impose that regulation on companies in a duopoly when it can be demonstrated that they are actively harming the market with their restrictions.

Even regulatory solutions are a balance; regulating an aggressive duopoly is different from regulating an entire market.

[nodamage]

> But in my mind, the point of bringing up individual malware examples is not to say that all regulation is worthless, it's to drive home that perfect security doesn't exist, that we shouldn't be striving for perfect security in the first place, and that the real world is about balancing security with other concerns.

I certainly agree that perfect security doesn't exist and we need to balance security with other concerns. However, I believe that a platform with strict controls directly contributes to increased security and privacy on that platform, and those factors are important to me, so the balance is worth the trade off. You are of course free to prioritize other concerns and purchase the device that best fits your concerns.

> There is no such thing as a malware free world, and saying, "this would increase malware" is not an immediately persuasive argument.

It is to me, because (as I said in my original comment in this thread) we already have two decades of history of malware on Windows and Android to show us what happens when you expose non-technical users to a highly popular, but unrestricted operating system.

> What are those risks? You want to get rid of cherry-picking, what kind of change in malware would we be talking about if we got rid of sideloading on Android or introduced it on iOS?

Nokia's latest threat intelligence whitepaper [1] says:

Among smartphones, Android™ devices are the most commonly targeted by malware. In mobile networks, Android devices were responsible for 47.15% of the observed malware infections, Windows©/ PCs for 35.82%, IoT for 16.17% and iPhones© for less than 1%.

I think the numbers speak for themselves and side-loading is exactly the reason why.

In 2018 Android based devices are once more the main target in mobile networks. In the smartphone sector, the vast majority of malware is currently distributed as trojanized applications. The user is tricked by phishing, advertising or other social engineering into downloading and installing the application. The main reason that the Android platform is targeted, is the fact that once side-loading is enabled, Android applications can be downloaded from just about anywhere. In contrast, iPhone applications are for the most part limited to one source, the Apple Store.

> The best data I'm seeing online suggests possibly an impact to 0.5% of current devices based on Android statistics,

I'm curious where that number came from? Individual Android malware attacks have affected up to 25 million devices [2], so that number doesn't really make sense to me.

> and that's assuming we can't get any other gains from sandboxing and user-education.

Note that most of of the counter examples in the comment I replied to were examples of developers abusing legitimate APIs. (Except the photo leak which IIRC was based on a phishing attack). Sandboxing is great for operating system level security but does nothing to help prevent these types of privacy violations, which are enforced via developer guidelines and the review process instead. Protecting privacy cannot merely be treated as a technical problem to be solved via OS-level security restrictions. User education also does not help here because the users have no idea what developers are doing under the hood.

> that's not a number that's big enough to justify abandoning a user's fundamental right to control what code runs on their device.

I'm not opposed to the idea of adding some sort of "developer mode" that allows advanced users to load third-party binaries after some very strict and specific warnings, so people who really know what they're doing can use it. I just think its a very bad idea for side-loading to become a primary method of app distribution, especially for general users.

[1] https://onestore.nokia.com/asset/205835

[2] https://www.theverge.com/2019/7/10/20688885/agent-smith-andr...

[danShumway]

Be careful of taking large percentages of small numbers. Right above the quote you list in the Nokia threat intelligence whitepaper:

> In 2018 the average monthly infection rate in mobile networks was 0.31%. This means that in any given month, one out of every 300 mobile devices had a high threat level malware infection.[0]

Let's assume that sideloading is responsible for literally everything happening on Android (it's not, but let's assume it is). We're talking about a reduction of <0.5% of current devices. I don't think that's a high enough number to justify getting rid of a fundamental user right.

I'm getting my numbers from some press releases[1], and from Google's 2018 security report for Android[2]. Google reports:

> In contrast, 0.68% of devices that installed apps from outside of Google Play were affected by one or more PHAs in 2018. While this number is 8 times higher than devices that exclusively used Google Play, it’s a noticeable improvement from 0.80% in 2017.

So even when looking purely at devices that allow sideloading (assuming that everyone who sideloads on Android is doing so unwittingly and is the victim of phishing, which, again, isn't the case), we still get a possible savings of ~0.6% of current Android devices.

Is it worth allowing Apple to destroy the entire games streaming market on iOS to save 0.5-0.6% of devices (approximately 1 in 200 devices)? Is protecting 1 in 200 devices worth allowing Apple to be anti-competitive towards music streaming platforms like Spotify? No, probably not -- especially since user education around the risks of sideloading means that at least some of those users are already making an educated choice about their own personal security risks.

> we already have two decades of history of malware on Windows and Android to show us what happens when you expose non-technical users to a highly popular, but unrestricted operating system.

We also have two decades of the web showing us that sandboxing untrusted code is a viable model for application distribution. It's not an accident that the web won as an application runtime/distribution platform for most people, and it's definitely not an accident that the web is one of the few platforms where end-users generally trust themselves to execute hundreds of blobs of unverified code per-person every single day.

Additionally, we're seeing data that suggests platforms like Android and Windows are becoming more secure despite the fact that they allow sideloading. So clearly there are gains to be made in this area beyond just getting rid of user rights.

> I'm not opposed to the idea of adding some sort of "developer mode" that allows advanced users to load third-party binaries after some very strict and specific warnings, so people who really know what they're doing can use it.

I think it's kind of a jump to assume that this isn't something that's mostly already happening on platforms like Android. It is very difficult to accidentally sideload an Android app unless you ignore security warnings.

And there's also a kind of double-standard here. We're assuming that every general user who buys an iPhone is doing so because they understand the underlying security model and are comfortable giving up their freedom in exchange for security. But we're not assuming that people who go through warnings to sideload apps are doing so with the understanding that there are security risks. Why is that?

We get into some uncomfortable questions about protecting users against their consent. If it could be shown that the majority of people sideloading today have no idea of the risk they're getting into, that would be something. But I'm uncomfortable assuming that. I'm uncomfortable looking at outcomes this small and saying that obviously those users need to be protected from themselves.

And I just don't buy your arguments around user education. It is possible to train people to be more secure, especially around well-defined boundaries like sideloading. The point of sandboxing and user-controlled permissions is to make it clear what developers are doing under the hood, because 'abusing legitimate APIs' is a subjective call that different users will have different standards for. Obviously there's more work to be done there, but platforms like Android, the web, and even iOS[3] are proving that users can be educated about topics like privacy and malware. I mean, even MacOS allows users to disable Gatekeeper and (in most cases) bypass the store for app distribution. Do we think that's a giant security risk?

Again, perfection is not the goal. If we're talking about an extra 1 in 200 devices getting infected with malware, and it's not particularly complicated for high-risk targets, companies, and even nontechnical users to completely avoid that extra risk, and we have pretty good evidence that we can get that number even lower without taking away user rights, then I just don't see a compelling reason to take away user rights.

[0]: https://onestore.nokia.com/asset/205835

[1]: https://www.zdnet.com/article/google-newer-android-versions-...

[2]: https://source.android.com/security/reports/Google_Android_S...

[3]: https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2020/08/ios-14-privacy-s...

[nodamage]

> We're talking about a reduction of <0.5% of current devices.

You're trying to use this number to downplay the severity of the malware problem on Android, but you need to be careful with the interpretation of this number. It's a rolling snapshot, not a measure of total devices affected.

What that means is if you get infected this month and fix your phone, and then I get infected next month and fix my phone, and a third person gets infected the next month and fixes their phone, and a fourth person gets infected the next month and fixes their phone, the snapshot will only capture 1/4 of the total number of infections even though all four of us got infected in the end.

What we really need is a metric of how many users are infected by at least one piece of malware during their ownership of the device.

Edit: I looked around and couldn't find this metric exactly, however I did find several even larger malware attacks that have individually infected way more than 0.5% of devices, which leads me to conclude the 0.5% number is extremely misleading.

- SimBad: 150 million (https://www.zdnet.com/article/almost-150-million-users-impac...)

- HummingBad: 85 million (https://www.zdnet.com/article/this-android-malware-has-infec...)

- Chamois: 199 million (https://source.android.com/security/reports/Google_Android_S...)

Is it worth having a strictly controlled review and install process in order to help prevent hundreds of millions of malware infections on your phone, the most important device in most people's pockets that contains all their messages, emails, photos, location history, health data, etc.? I believe so.

> I don't think that's a high enough number to justify getting rid of a fundamental user right.

I take issue with framing this as a "fundamental user right". If you want to execute unapproved code on the iPhone you already have multiple options, such as using the standard developer SDKs or jailbreaking. What you are claiming is a "fundamental user right" is actually the right for third-party developers to distribute unvetted binaries for installation using platform-sanctioned infrastructure. I think it's a huge stretch to call that a "fundamental user right".

(Granted, I also think calling gun ownership a "fundamental right" is completely and utterly ridiculous, but different people have different opinions on what is truly fundamental.)

> > In contrast, 0.68% of devices that installed apps from outside of Google Play were affected by one or more PHAs in 2018. While this number is 8 times higher than devices that exclusively used Google Play, it’s a noticeable improvement from 0.80% in 2017.

So Google's own statistics say devices that use side-loading have an 8x higher risk of malware. That is significant.

> We also have two decades of the web showing us that sandboxing untrusted code is a viable model for application distribution.

I don't think it's fair to compare the two as browser sandboxing is significantly more restrictive than app sandboxing. Sure, if we restricted apps to the same degree that we restrict the browser, that would definitely improve security, at the cost of functionality.

> Additionally, we're seeing data that suggests platforms like Android and Windows are becoming more secure despite the fact that they allow sideloading.

Yes, because they've intentionally made side-loading more difficult with every release, which means fewer people are doing it, which reduces the attack vector.

> But we're not assuming that people who go through warnings to sideload apps are doing so with the understanding that there are security risks. Why is that?

Because we literally saw what happened when Epic attempted to release their app outside the Google Play Store. Non-technical users went ahead and checked the box to allow side-loading because they wanted to play Fortnite. Then they ended up downloading fake Fortnite APKs cause they didn't know where to get the right one.

You're acting as if these risks are hypothetical when we've already seen this same story play out over and over again.

> And I just don't buy your arguments around user education.

I'm not sure you actually understood this argument. Consider an app that might request access to your contacts for a legitimate purpose (like messaging your friends), that then secretly decides to store and transmits that data for a malicious purpose (like selling your contacts to third parties). No amount of sandboxing, education, or permissions management will prevent this kind of privacy abuse.

> I mean, even MacOS allows users to disable Gatekeeper and (in most cases) bypass the store for app distribution. Do we think that's a giant security risk?

Yes, of course it is. Mac OS has a worse malware history than iOS.

[danShumway]

> a rolling measure, not the measure of total devices affected.

The Google numbers I list are not monthly rolling measures, they're for the entirety of 2018. They're also specific to users who sideload. So it's not that 0.68 percent of Android users downloaded malware in 2018, it's that of the subset of devices that actively sideloaded apps, ~2/300 ended up encountering malware at some point during the year.

And this ends up mattering because it means that you can almost entirely eliminate that risk by just deciding for yourself whether or not you want to sideload.

> devices that use side-loading have an 8x higher risk of malware. That is significant.

An 8x increase that still results in less than a 1% risk over an entire year. The context matters, we are talking about extremely small numbers. The current numbers mean that if you own an Android device for 6 years and you regularly sideload applications every single year, you have a 4% chance of getting infected during that time. And this is assuming that nothing else changes to make sideloading more secure, that none of the education measures work, and that you don't sideload one or two important apps and then just turn the feature off.

When you only focus on the percentage change, you miss the bigger picture of what the malware risks actually are for phones. 4% is a number we would like to be lower. We always want the number to be lower. But not at the cost of an entire market. That 4% needs to be stacked against the costs of market capture and anti-competitive behavior.

Quick sidenote, I don't think it's that hard to explain the numbers you're seeing online. There are almost 2.5 billion android devices in use globally. 200 million of 2.5 billion is a little less than 1 percent. I could easily see factors like repeat infections driving that number lower (Google is only counted infected devices, it's not counting the number of infections per device). Those numbers are surprising to me in that they might indicate that a lot more people are sideloading than I expected. But even that is balanced out by the fact that the majority of these cases aren't exclusive to sideloaded apps, they also made their way onto official app stores.

I'm definitely interested in hearing more about them, but I'm not looking at these numbers and thinking, "Google's official security reports are lying."

> I don't think it's fair to compare the two as browser sandboxing is significantly more restrictive than app sandboxing. Sure, if we restricted apps to the same degree that we restrict the browser, that would definitely improve security, at the cost of functionality.

If we want to go down this route, iOS is also fundamentally more restrictive than Android. Android has a permission that allows apps to just directly read sections of the SD card. I think that's a stupid permission for Android to have, and I would hazard that the malware numbers you're looking at would be lower if Android didn't have all of this crap. I shouldn't need to give a photo application access to my SD card just to take a picture.

On the subject of the web: yes, the web is more restrictive than native in many ways. But it's rapidly getting less restrictive, and we're now even considering permissions like native file access. That expansion in functionality is happening because we're seeing that sandboxing works. A lot of the legitimate permissions that we're trying to prevent abuse of within native apps (contacts, advertising IDs, location, data-sharing between apps, camera/microphone access) are areas that the web has grappled with and handled, for the most part, adequately.

It's not a perfect comparison -- if the web could do everything native apps could do, nobody would be writing native apps. But the growth of the web as a platform still suggests that sandboxing is something we should be taking very seriously.

> Yes, because they've intentionally made side-loading more difficult with every release, which means fewer people are doing it, which reduces the attack vector.

Reread that. Google saw a 15% reduction in malware among phones that sideload apps. Not overall across the entire ecosystem, among the people doing the behavior you think is too risky for them to do. We can improve the malware stats among people who sideload.

> Because we literally saw what happened when Epic attempted to release their app outside the Google Play Store.

What's our position on cherry-picking again?

More importantly, what's our basis for saying that when people clicked the checkbox and said, "I understand the risks, I still want to take those risks so I can get Fortnite", that was an accident or that they didn't understand what they were risking?

It is possible for someone to do something risky and get malware even though they generally understood the risks. And to get back to what I'm talking about with consent, I am uncomfortable with the idea that we need to go to people and tell them what risks they are and aren't allowed to take. If we believe that everyone who buys an iPhone is doing so because they are consciously balancing their security/freedom, why do we throw that philosophy out the window when someone makes a conscious decision to sideload an app? Not every user is going to have the same risk tolerance, and it's fine for users to have different degrees of risk tolerance.

> Consider an app that might request access to your contacts for a legitimate purpose (like messaging your friends), that then secretly decides to store and transmits that data for a malicious purpose (like selling your contacts to third parties). No amount of sandboxing, education, or permissions management will prevent this kind of privacy abuse.

No amount of anything will stop that privacy abuse other than extensive corporate auditing, which nobody (including Apple) is prepared to do. Apple can't prevent an app from secretly selling your data, it can only ban the app after the fact. And once it becomes public knowledge which apps are selling your data, then education and permissions management starts to matter again.

The only preemptive thing we can do is to make it obvious when apps are transmitting data and to what location. We can also train users to stick to commercially vetted apps and to do a little bit of research to figure out whether a company seems sleazy, or if they've popped up out of nowhere. But that's the most we can do. Apple's moderation team doesn't have any kind of magical ability to tell what I'm doing with user data once I've gotten it onto my servers.

> such as using the standard developer SDKs or jailbreaking

I wonder, back when Apple was arguing that distributing jailbreaks for iOS should be illegal, did they have any idea that it would someday be a core argument as to why they weren't actually suppressing user rights?

If you don't think that the user right to decide what code runs on their own devices is a fundamental right, then that might just be a disagreement we have. I think it is a fundamental right, and I don't think that the developer SDKs or the constantly shifting jailbreaking communities satisfy that right. But if you disagree with me on that, then we disagree, that's fine. There's no short argument I can come up with as to why you should believe it's a fundamental right.

> Yes, or course it is. Mac OS has a worse malware history than iOS.

To that point, usually people don't try to argue that sideloading should be removed from desktop computers. It's an interesting and kind of troubling shift to see this argument popping up now. You're not the first person to suggest it, but I'm still always surprised when I see it. What would the computing industry look like today if early Windows/Macs had only been able to run authorized software?

[nodamage]

> The Google numbers I list are not monthly rolling measures, they're for the entirety of 2018.

Fair enough, I was referring to the "average monthly infection rate" from the text you quoted.

However, I am having trouble reconciling Google's numbers with the numbers from other reports. For example, Kaspersky's mobile malware evolution report (https://securelist.com/mobile-malware-evolution-2019/96280/) says 13.89% of users in the United States were attacked by mobile malware in 2019. The number is as high as 60% for Iran.

> 200 million of 2.5 billion is a little less than 1 percent.

That's 8%. I don't understand how Google can say in the same report, that 199 million devices were infected by a single piece of malware, but only a maximum of 0.68% devices were affected? Something doesn't add up.

(I'll address your other points when I have more free time.)