| Is there anything else to these confidential machines other than feel-good, security theater or certification checkmarks? Maybe I'm overly cynical, but I don't quite understand the target audience. For basic security and isolation between tenants as well as intrusion prevention from third parties, I'd personally trust Google's SRE team more than any other cloud provider in the world. They seem to have a great historical record and if they had any slip ups there, their business would be impacted for years. For access to state actors, I'd trust these machines not any bit more than conventional ones. If the key is held in memory, it's accessible. Even if it wasn't, the data would be captured at the storage layer boundary if it was of any interest. |
> Maybe I'm overly cynical, but I don't quite understand the target audience.
No, that sounds about right.
Google Cloud's confidential computing is essentially a wrapper for AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (along with auditing tools), which is meant to be a physical protection measure. It can potentially protect against an attack like Rowhammer or Meltdown, but beyond that, Confidential Computing is primarily a protection mechanism if your threat model includes Google's own admins, which it might if you're in a heavily-regulated industry and have to tick a bunch of audit check boxes.
More critically, this can make cloud hosting an option for industries that previously rejected it due having to outsource system management to a third party. I don't know of any off-hand, but I have no doubt that they exist.
That being said, the allure of AMD SEV is that it provides encryption-in-use without worrying about performance, redesigning your applications, or overall having to think about it too much. If it's just a toggle you can flip and move on to other things, does it matter if the security benefit is only theoretical?