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by Gipetto
2109 days ago
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So, does this mean that users hand over permissions to a 3rd party to index internal company systems?
So you could read a Confluence instance, or some other kind of wiki, and be a vector for data/security leaks? Seems like there should be a "talk to your security team" disclaimer... people get fired for granting access like that. |
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There are details throughout this post, but I will summarize our high-level approach.
* When we request permissions, we request a minimal set. For example, you can connect Drive with just meta-data access and our access will be scoped accordingly.
* Everything is encrypted. Importantly, it's also encrypted in the data store itself. If our DB was compromised, the entries would not be readable (ECIES, Secp256k1, AES256+CTR). Only exception is the reverse index.
* The operations that involve encryption / decryption of encrypted content live in an isolated layer.
* Token storage follows similar methodology
* We get a pentest and security reviews quarterly
* We also have strict company policies around IT and infrastructure access
That said, we aren't ever at a terminal point in our security story.
Our experience has been that security conscious companies simply turn off ability to connect third party applications.